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PAPER ONE: A LITERATURE REVIEW OF RECIPROCITY AND ITS ROLE IN
ACCOUNTING LITERATURE

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to discuss reciprocity and the role it plays in helping us
understand interactions between parties in accounting settings. The concept of reciprocity states
that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish unkind behaviors. (Fisher et al. 2015;
Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Gächter 1997). When trying to trace the origins of the theory of
reciprocity, it is useful to track the initial constructs on which it is built from various literary
sources. This process contributes to developing an understanding of how reciprocity is used to
explain behaviors in the workplace. The notion of reciprocity has a long history and is defined in
many iterations of social literature dating back to ancient philosophers. Roman politician Cicero,
for example, stated: “there is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness” and
“all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit” (Gouldner 1960). This early philosophical sentiment
exemplifies the integral role positive reciprocity plays in society and the potential avarice an
individual may encounter when not returning positive actions with displays of positive
reciprocity.
Through this review, I gather literature that builds on the concept of reciprocity. I
organize commonly found themes and organize settings previously used to focus on the multiple
constructs to build upon reciprocity.

KEYWORDS: Reciprocity, Trust, Distributional Fairness, Intention, Attribution.
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BACKGROUND AND RECIPROCITY LITERATURE
Adam Smith (1817) also highlighted the importance of both positive and negative
reciprocity for a cohesive society. In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” Smith describes
constructs that parallel positive and negative reciprocity in terms of “social passions” and
“unsocial passions.” Social passions (i.e., positive reciprocity) are noted to be essential for
harmonious relations in which “mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy,
with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other person” (Smith 1817, 47).
Conversely, unsocial passions (i.e., negative reciprocity) are deemed “necessary parts of the
character of human nature” because an individual will “become contemptible, who tamely sits
still, and submits to insults, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them” (Smith 1817,
45). The latter quote suggests that if one receives acts of ill intention, social culture expects the
individual to respond in kind (negatively) to counter the social injustice.
Now that a very brief overview of historical examples of reciprocity is established, the
remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section (II), I briefly contextualize
reciprocity and its role in business contexts outside the accounting literature, focusing primarily
on those of economic and management studies, especially those dealing with market exchanges,
organizational behavior, social contracts, and leader-member exchange (LMX). Last, I review
and synthesize accounting literature that pertains to each of three dominant dimensions of
reciprocity: distributional fairness, trust, and intention.
Reciprocity has been prevalent throughout management and organizational behavior
literature, especially in the narrower focus of LMX theory (Joseph, Newman, and Sin 2011).
Much of the focus in this field is on creating measures to predict successful relationship qualities
between leaders (managers) and followers (employees) within an organization. Then, evaluating
6
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qualities that increase subordinate satisfaction, performance, career success, and reduce turnover
rates are of particular interest (Gerstner and Day 1997; Graen et al. 1982; Dansereau, Alutto,
Markham, and Dumas 1982; Dansereau, Graen and Haga 1975; Wakabayashi and Graen 1984;
Vecchio 1982; Bernardin 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995; Graen, George and Cashman 1975).
In the commonly used LMX-7 model, seven questions are utilized to determine individuals’
perception of the “quality of exchange between supervisors and subordinates” from the
perspective of both the leader and follower (Scandura and Graen, 1984). In the most rudimentary
sense, this model attempts to assess levels of mutual trust, respect, loyalty, and subordinate role
clarity as independent variables to predict dependent output variables. Output variables of
interest include levels of productivity, job attitude (i.e., subordinate satisfaction), performance
(i.e., supervisor satisfaction), and perceptions the superior has of the subordinate and vice-versa.
Previous literature indicates that leaders and members’ perceptions of LMX are
correlated, and agreement between these parties strengthens over the length of their relationship
(Gerstner et al. 1997; Sin et al. 2009). This agreement between leaders and members indicates a
reciprocal tendency, especially when both parties are either pleased or displeased with each
other. Further, this literature suggests that such reciprocal tenancies compound over time as
individuals in relationships treat each other either kindly or poorly.
Much of the theory of intentionality intersects with that of attribution within the
management literature. This is because intentionality and attribution refer to how an individual
acts due to a perception that he or she forms of a certain external event. While these two
dimensions seem to form two sides of the same coin, intentionality refers to assessing
individuals’ perceptions formed of an outside influence placed on them, while attribution refers
to an internal influence on some sort of outcome. The theory of intentionality “hypothesizes that
7
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a person’s attitude toward an occurrence depends on an individual’s perceptions of how that
outcome is related to the occurrence of other “more or less preferred consequences.” This theory
is an early example of how organizations can benefit from creating a “reciprocating
environment” (Graen 1969, 1). Attribution theory, however, states that positive performance is
likely to be internalized by an individual and therefore increases the perception that one deserves
reward as a consequence of satisfactory behavior. Attribution theory predicts that one does not
attribute unsatisfactory outcomes, such as failure, to oneself. Therefore, individuals may not
perceive that they deserve negative consequences that result from unsatisfactory outcomes.
Equity theory predicts that individuals within relationships, such as subordinates and superiors,
are motivated by the pursuit of fairness. These individuals will likely adjust their contributions
until an acceptable level of equity is reached. Equity theory is a complementary theory to that of
instrumentality (Dansereau, Cashman, Graen 1973). Both theories can be used to predict positive
LMX relationships and costly turnover within an organization.
RECIPROCITY IN THE BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNTING LITERATURE
Reciprocity is defined in this manuscript as the tendency to reward kind actions with kind
actions and to punish unkind actions with unkind actions. Given this definition, this section
outlines the theoretical dimensions that underlie varying facets of reciprocity explored in the
behavioral accounting literature. Specifically, trust, distributional fairness, and intention tend to
be the most pervasive theories used within the accounting literature to explain and describe how
reciprocity dictates behavior. Following discussion of these three dimensions, I show that
reciprocity plays an integral role in negotiation tactics. Table 1.1 shows a collection of works
discussing general reciprocity in previous literature, and Figure 1 presents a visual representation
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of the predicted relations between trust, distributional fairness, intention and sensitivity to
reciprocity.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
[Insert Table 1.1 Here]
Trust
Bradach and Eccles (1989, 104) define trust as “a type of expectation that alleviates the
fear that one's exchange partner will act opportunistically.” For cooperation between parties to
exist, trust must be established so parties can exchange in an honest manner (Zaheer et al. 1998;
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). Placed in the context of reciprocity, we expect that honesty
begets a sense of trustworthiness, and dishonesty begets untrustworthiness (see Table 1.2).
Similarly, showing trust is expected to beget honest responses, whereas showing distrust would
elicit dishonest responses. In economic games, a balancing act is played between two parties in
an exchange. Each party must decide how much to act in a manner that protects its interest from
a purely economic perspective (e.g., each party must decide whether to show a lack of trust or act
dishonestly as agency theory would predict). However, potentially negative repercussions could
develop from overly protecting ones’ economic interest if the other party decides to respond in
kind. This response in kind is reciprocal behavior. Thus, there is a clear relation between trust
and honest behavior in the context of reciprocal behavior.
Lewis and Weigert (1985, 970) state that “trust is characterized by a cognitive leap
beyond the expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant.” Such an idea of trust
is contrary to expected behavior stemming from classic economic agency theory, where an
agent’s utility is assumed to be based on pecuniary incentives (Pepper and Gore 2012).
Traditional forms of agency theory, however, do not encompass an individual’s innate tendency
9
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to behave honestly. Instead, under traditional agency theory, all individuals are primarily
concerned with self-interest, with little, if any, regard for others. It would, therefore, be a “leap”
for one party to expect that the other would act in a manner that required a sacrifice of wealth to
benefit all individuals involved.
Studies such as Fehr et al. (1999) indicate that individuals show preferences for honesty,
even when honesty is costly, which is in direct opposition to theories predicting that each player
in an exchange acts only in a way to increase personal wealth if they have the means to do so.
Thus, reciprocity can be how an individual acts to increase both parties’ utility. While this may
sound counter-intuitive, we see the combination of the two schools of thought when we
encounter studies such as Trivers (1971), which gives insight into “reciprocal altruism,” where
first movers act in a way in which they expect to increase their economic utility through expected
return of perceived altruistic behavior. In this sense, we are shown how reciprocity can be parsed
out from pure altruism (i.e., acts of kindness where there is no expectation of return) in the sense
that a return of equal or greater value is expected.
Prior Literature
Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser (2001) is a seminal study in the
behavioral/experimental accounting literature that laid the foundation for experimentation
involving participative budgeting scenarios. In practice, organizations utilize participative
budgeting to allow managers to act on private information for more efficient processes; however,
it creates a possibility for managers to act opportunistically. In this experiment, Evans et al.
(2001) draw from theories including trust, honesty, distributional fairness, and intention to lay
the groundwork for subsequent behavioral accounting studies. Evans et al. (2001) find evidence
consistent with the assertion that traditional economic agency theory does not fully explain
10
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manager behavior. Specifically, in a trust contract scenario in which managers are able to take
full economic advantage of private information they possess, participants showed honesty
preferences, even in the absence of repercussions for acting in a dishonest manner. While
explanations beyond preferences for honesty were not explicitly discussed, the study opened a
door for future exploration utilizing this trust contract as a base control for experiments.
While behavioral results found by Evans could be classified as altruistic behavior, as
there was no potential for another party to respond in kind, subsequent studies modified the
Evans et al. (2001) setting to include strategic interaction (for a discussion of this literature, see
Brink, Coats, and Rankin, 2018). In this setting, reciprocal behavior became possible.
Specifically, negative reciprocal behavior could occur where a perceived lack of trust causes an
increase in dishonest behavior. For example, subsequent studies (Antle and Eppen 1985) placed
participants in hurdle contracts setting (i.e., they were restricted in that they only attained a
certain percentage of the overall slack available). In these settings, the decision was no longer an
entirely ethical dilemma regarding how much a subordinate was willing to keep. Rather, the
implementation of a hurdle has been interpreted as a sign of negative trust shown by the superior
enforcing it as a control. Because of this shift in focus from one of ethical consideration,
subordinates under this control were shown to adjust their behavior to wealth-creating activity,
rather than the previous trust scenario in which they showed greater levels of honesty in their
reporting (Evans et al. 2001).
Rankin (2008) shows a stark effect of trust being given to a subordinate to report
factually. It is shown that when there is an ethical dilemma, i.e., subordinates must confirm
having reported honestly, the focus on honesty and the negative utility from acting otherwise is
taken into consideration and affects their decision making. However, in a situation in which trust
11
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is removed from subordinates, i.e., a scenario in which the superior has final authority, the focus
on a potential ethical dilemma is removed from their decision in a way that causes them not to
change their levels of honesty regardless of whether they must confirm that they acted honestly.
LMX literature suggests that reciprocal behavior also has a tendency to become
magnified over time as negative actions are met with negative reactions, and positive actions are
responded with positive reactions. Fisher, Peffer, Sprinkle and Williamson (2015) designed a
trust game experiment in which a superior requested effort and the subordinate responded with a
willingness to provide a certain level of effort. Higher expectations of effort were predicted to
induce feelings of negative reciprocity, much like tightening a control. Because of this potential
negative reaction from subordinates, the results indicated that superiors altered their strategies
over time in a manner consistent with realizing that demanding too much effort would induce
negative reciprocity. This is consistent with a strategy a manager would use to induce trust with
subordinates. Subordinates responded to reduced effort demands with positive reciprocity in the
form of higher levels of effort.
Building trust between employees can also be a determinate of organizational success.
Coletti et al. (2005) found that control systems have the potential to induce cooperative behavior
between employees. Even more interesting, Coletti found that while it was expected that external
observations participants’ cooperative behavior would be altered by the knowledge that
participants were under the control to induce cooperation and would view positively cooperative
behavior as less inherently trustworthy than would participants who cooperated without some
outside control leading to such behavior, no significant difference was found. This implies that
cooperation is viewed as an indication of trust whether it was influenced by an outside source or
not.
12
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While reciprocity can be easily identified in literature exploring interactions between
parties in managerial accounting and auditing, applications in financial accounting are not, as
accounting decisions are numerous and may not always be immediately identifiable. However,
reciprocity is likely to have implications for responses to firm actions such as investor reactions
to corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Kim et al.2012). Many companies are now expected to
engage in CSR activity to build trust with their investors, often in the form of improving either
the community in which they do business, the environment, or other forms of philanthropy1. If
they do not engage in such activity, it is possible that the market will see this as a lack of trustbuilding and retaliate by lowering the perceived value of such firms. Further, reciprocity may
play a role in describing how stakeholders respond to top management. For example,
stakeholders may respond reciprocally to management engaging in underhanded activity or
deception.
Another interaction in which we see trust and subsequent reciprocity at work is between
top managers and analyst engagement. Analysts provide valuations of a company and estimates
of future profitability. If this information is reliable, investors are able to trust analysts and return
to them for continued forecasts (Brown et al. 2015). However, to keep a step ahead of their
competition, analysts must garner information not yet available to the public. To do so, they must
often curry favor from top management to obtain privately held information (Ke and Yu 2006).
As a result, there is a potential for analysts’ information to be subject to misrepresentation or
bias. Typically, top managers’ desire to either meet or beat expectations derived from analysts’
forecasts through various means of manipulations through guidance (Ito et al. 1998; Richardson

“The distribution of wealth is a comparison of the wealth of various members or groups in a society”
For the purpose of this manuscript wealth is defined as any utility increasing proxy, be it monetary, effort, or
otherwise.
6
7
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et al. 2004; Bartov et al. 2002; Matsumoto 2002; Kothari 2009). Analysts may wish to stay in
favor with top management, and top managers may desire to keep a positive public financial
image. As a result, a reciprocal relationship may be created in which top managers are more
willing to share private information with those analysts who assist management in guiding the
market in a way that is favorable in the public eye (Ho et al. 2018; Mayhew 2008; Westphal
2008). Further, top management may punish analysts who downgrade their firm’s stock
recommendations (Mayhew 2008; Westphal 2008). This reciprocal relationship between analysts
and top management is so strong that it has even been shown that analysts will go so far as to
“migrate” with a manager if they move to another firm (Brochet et al. 2010).2 Table 1.2 shows a
collection of works discussing the dimension of trust and its role in reciprocity previously
researched.
[Insert Table 1.2 Here]
Distributional Fairness
Distributional fairness, sometimes also referred to as distributive justice, is generally
defined as the perception that participants within either a single or series of interactions show
preference in creating an overall state of relative equality. Individuals often act in a manner that
shows a preference for fairness in a distribution for various forms of utility, be it that of wealth,
resources, or effort. This behavior is expected for participants on either side of the equilibrium
scale; for example, individuals may give their wealth to others in an attempt to create a state of
distributional equilibrium. Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990), and Messick and
Sentis (1983) indicate that preference for fairness is a construct independent of acts of fairness;

8

Dictator games commonly give a single individual power over the distribution of wealth in a way that they are
initially endowed with a greater deal of wealth.
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individuals may also use destructive acts to balance the scales. In other words, individuals’
inclination for fairness is often counter to both their own preferences for wealth creation and
those they are responding to, again indicating behavior contrary to traditional economic agency
theory.
Literature shows that perceptions of distributional fairness can lead to reciprocal
behavior. Rabin (1993), provides a tie between distributional fairness and reciprocity by
demonstrating that individuals are more likely to engage in activities that restore a feeling of
equilibrium depending on their state emotion. For example, if a company acts in a monopolistic
manner, a consumer in the economy may be less likely to purchase services from that company
(Fehr et al. 1998; Rabin 1993). Similarly, if union members feel they are being treated unfairly,
they are more likely to go on strike to punish their employer. This is often true even if a strike
entails the loss of current income for the employees (damaging their wealth), which contrasts
with the expectation of wealth maximization from traditional economic theory. With these two
examples, we see that individuals are likely to give up wealth to both help and harm others to
restore equity.
Prior Literature
A model utilized in Douthit and Stevens (2014) was designed to manipulate individuals’
perceptions of distributional fairness. In this, a manipulation of the salience of distributional
fairness (i.e., pay disparity between subordinate and superior) was either public or private
information. For those in a manipulation in which the subordinate felt there was a lack of
distributional fairness (i.e., the salience of disparity of income received by the subordinate
compared to that of their superior), subordinates responded with lower levels of honesty in the
form of increased budgetary slack during participative budgeting exchange rounds.
15
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Contract designs between organizations and their employees also play an integral role in
affecting reciprocity. In the sense of agency theory, organizations seek contract designs that take
advantage of their specific market (Baiman 1982). More specifically, classic agency theory states
that the goal of “optimal agency contracts” for an organization would be to “maximize firm
profit, taking into account employees’ rationality and incentive compatibility constraints”
(Kuang 2009, 2011). In this vein of research, however, optimal agency contracts are largely met
with negative reciprocity from those offered such contracts. Further, while in scenarios of
participative salary negotiation under an output-based contract, i.e., basing employees’ salary on
the amount of additional utility provided to the organization, potential new employees are able to
make a counteroffer for the rate they will be paid for their efforts. Clearly, superiors have more
negotiating power than do subordinates, and this is met with feelings of negative reciprocity
(Kuang 2011). Potentially worse, newly hired subordinates can be left with the perception that
their negotiation ability was actually “pseudo participative” in that they never had any real say in
the matter of their salary. Collectively, these perceptions are primarily due to the feeling of being
sold short for the effort an individual has put forward (i.e., the company offering the minimum
for the maximum effort requested). Therefore, organizations can be more effective when
designing contracts that consider both financial and nonfinancial benefits/detriments caused by
certain contract structures, such as costs of the actual salary and potential lower future employee
efforts. Organizations could then utilize reciprocity-based contracts to increase subordinates’
subsequent level of effort, increasing firms’ overall profits. (Hannan 2005; Kuang 2009; Sprinkle
2003; Bonner et al. 2000).
Reciprocity has a considerable role in contract design related to individuals’ expectations
that must be fulfilled. This sense of entitlement was shown previously where participants exhibit
16
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higher levels of effort for higher wages, which is logical, however, the consideration of relative
cost to additional input received by the organization was not initially considered. Therefore, the
salience of the gift (additional wages) was shown to play an integral role in employees’ sense of
reciprocity and its true ability to affect an employee’s output (Hannan, Kagel, and Moser 2002).
While a majority of the accounting literature on distributional fairness attends to
interactions with is a direct exchange of wealth between individuals in the sense that as one
party’s wealth increases/decreases, the second party moves in the opposite direction, third parties
(i.e., observers of behavior) are also found to be subject to distributional fairness preferences.
Maas (2012), for example, shows that managers can act as third parties by allocating wealth
between multiple employees. Because supplemental information gathering depletes managers’
resources, they may be unlikely to seek additional information on individual employees’ efforts
toward a team’s overall performance. However, Maas showed that managers are compelled to
seek out costly information to ensure that employees’ efforts are rewarded fairly. A potential
implication of this is a manager’s desire to increase each employee’s efforts for improved future
performance of the team.
In addition to an individual’s innate sense of preference for distributional fairness, it has
been shown that encouraging individuals to be mindful of fairness (causing a higher level of
salience of such equilibrium) when brainstorming a bargaining strategy can increase the
likelihood they will act in a cooperative manner. Maxwell et al. (1999) found that buyers who
were encouraged to consider fairness in this manner responded by shifting the focus of their
decision from themselves to what would potentially be fairer for the seller. In a later study
(Maxwell et al. 2003), the seller in a similar negotiation failed to reciprocate fair behavior. In
response, buyers responded with reduced levels of cooperation and seemingly vindictive
17
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behavior. These studies illustrate that negative reciprocity can occur within interactions to the
detriment of both parties when they do not act to maintain distributional fairness.
Direction for Future Research
Contract settings seem of particular interest especially now (NLRA or the Act; 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 [Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter II, United States Code] Messina 2012). This
salience of cross-distributional fairness could be of interest, as most of the research has been
focused on that of the interaction between a manager and employee’s compensation, control of
compensation, negotiation, and saliency. However, utilizing a horizontal manipulation, i.e.,
between employees, especially in the form of saliency of the level of distributional fairness, may
play on the effort levels of an employee. Table 1.3 shows a collection of works discussinglists
notable research in the dimensionfield of distributional fairness and its role in reciprocity
previously researched.
[Insert Table 1.3 Here]
Intention
Intentionality “is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to
stand for, things, properties and states of affairs” (Jacob 2019). Intentionality indicates that
organizations can benefit from creating a “reciprocating environment” (Graen 1969, 1). This,
however, was not always considered the case. In the early 1990s, much of the economic
literature asserted that, except true altruism, acts of selflessness do not have a logical place in
predicting a player’s behavior in economic games. If an individual engages in behavior that is
beneficial to another individual without expected recourse of positive return or investment of
either effort or wealth, that behavior largely departs from simple individual wealth creation
expected in early economic theory (Rabin 1993).
18
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Intention we see in literature as individuals’ perception of activity, external from their
locus of control that affects individuals’ in either a positive (trust) or negative (distrust) light
(Enzle and Anderson 1993). Because this is a matter of the individual’s perception of the
underlying reason behind another’s activity, rather than objective reasoning, the salience of such
activity and source becomes paramount as to how the outside action is perceived. For example, a
company may implement a control over its employees to restrict certain behavior. If both are
made aware of such an action (increased salience) and they can directly identify the source, as
,for example, originating from their superior, they may perceive this as a signal of lack of trust.
This negative perception may, in turn, be responded to with negative reciprocity in which
subordinates respond in kind with negative and potentially destructive behavior (Christ 2013).
Prior Literature
A key to any organization’s overall success rests in the ability of its members to
cooperate to achieve the maximum output for all those involved. In seminal research, such as
Nash Equilibrium scenarios, we see that the greatest output for all players is typically not in
favor of an individual’s maximum potential output. To nurture this cooperation, it has been
found that trust is critical (Coletti et al. 2005; Zaheer et al. 1998; Zaheer and Venkatraman
1995). While managers are often tempted to relieve woes of agency issues by implementing
controls, they must ensure that controls are implemented carefully to foster an environment of
cooperation. In managerial accounting studies, we are tasked with exploring potential factors
may change an individual’s behavior in a way that is both cost-effective and psychologically
effective (Christ 2008). One area in which this occurs is within formal controls that can be
imposed by an overseeing element, such as an organization or individual in a superior role.
Christ (2008) organizes these formal controls into three categories: “behavior,” “output,” and
19
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“inspection.” “Behavior” represents a superior’s direct oversight of a worker’s activities.
“Output” focuses on how such controls affect performance measurements after a formal control
has been put into place. Finally, “inspection” of the controls themselves deals primarily with
accounting and financial reporting, as well as billing and asset security.
Behavior controls are input through direct surveillance of individuals’ activities. They are
likely most relatable to experiments conducted in managerial accounting research, such as Christ
(2013) and Christ and Vance (2017). In these studies, participants are subjected to varying levels
of intrusiveness, primarily manipulated by the salience of the source of the control exogenous
(i.e., the control’s origin is ambiguous) or endogenous (i.e., the control is directly imposed by a
superior). In these studies, the expectation is that there will be incrementally larger negative
reactions from subordinates as the level of intrusiveness or valence of control implemented by
the superior increases.
Second, output controls are regularly examined in managerial research, particularly in
participative budgeting where superiors are able to review subordinates’ performance and
respond according to their performance assessments (largely measured by the effort given toward
their task). Within this type of research, we see a variance in behavior of superiors who are given
the ability to implement different methods of controls. Bonus contracts, such as those used in
Christ (2012), encourage positive reciprocity and are effective for increasing measures of both
cost benefit to the organization and psychological utility for the subordinate. Conversely, when
managers are endowed with the ability to punish, subordinates tend to respond negatively. Thus,
while the use of control instruments may be shown to be monetarily effective within some
studies, Christ (2012) shows that there are cases in which subordinates’ psychological utility is
lowered so significantly that it is a detriment to the firm’s success. Penalty contracts can be so
20
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harmful to relationship qualities between managers and subordinates that subordinates go so far
as to not only withhold effort to help but increase effort to punish the manager Christ (2018).
Several participative budgeting studies further explore these phenomena by utilizing
various manipulations to elicit feelings of either negative or positive reciprocity that could be
found in practical settings. In Christ (2013), reciprocity was manipulated by adjusting
employees’ beliefs about management’s intentions signaled by the source of control imposed.
When subordinates were able to identify the source of control as that of their direct superior, they
perceived such constraints as a signal of lower trust imparted by their superiors. This, in turn,
caused subordinates to respond with lower effort.
Largely, accounting literature suggests that implementing controls over subordinates
lowers overall budgetary slack (Douthit and Stevens 2014; Schatzberg and Stevens 2008) (see
Table 1.4). However, such controls have the potential to reframe the participative budgeting
scenario from an ethical dilemma where they are primarily motivated by honesty to one of a
strategic interaction where they may be motivated by pecuniary concerns (Brink et al. 2018). In
the case of Rankin et al. (2008) for example, when subordinates have the final say in a
negotiation and must give a confirmation that they have acted in an honest manner, slack is
significantly decreased. However, slack is not shown to change from this ethical confirmation
when the final authorization authority is given to their superior. Rankin et al. (2008) illustrate
that controls may have unintended consequences.
Christ (2013) showed that a when a superior imposes a direct control over a subordinate,
the subordinate may respond with negative reciprocity. Specifically, if subordinates perceive that
the control is directly implemented by their superior, they will likely perceive this as a signal of
distrust and respond with negative reciprocity (costly/destructive behavior), whereas if the
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control is ambiguous, they may not form this perception and not retaliate. In short, the social
costs may not be worth the expected monetary benefits of the control particularly, if subordinates
would act within a reasonable level of honesty in the absence of the formal control.
Intentions can also be gleaned from the context of the scenario setting. Choi (2013)
demonstrated such contextual effects in an experimental setting where labor markets were
manipulated to see if individuals’ perceptions of a signing bonus when offered a contract were
adjusted by the environment. More specifically it was sought if varying conditions could alter a
potential new hires perception of a bonus offer as either that of an organization’s gesture of good
faith or simply necessity to attain a new hire. In instances of surplus labor markets (i.e., labor
markets with an excess of jobseekers), individuals perceived a signing bonus as an act of good
will and reciprocated with increased levels of effort. However, in labor markets with an excess of
jobs positions, individuals felt entitled to such a reward and did not reciprocate with increased
levels of effort.
Direction for Future Research
Intention is a unique dimension of reciprocity in that it is a perception of an interaction
between two parties and the underlying tone one believes another’s actions imply. While at the
root of much research we see that actions like implementing controls on an individual, for
example, can cause an individual to feel negative reciprocity, it is possible that individual traits
can cause individuals to have varying levels of sensitivity to reciprocity. For example, if an
organization implements a control over an individual’s processes, one who is sensitive to
reciprocity may see this as indicating that the organization does not trust the individual and may
respond in a destructive manner. However, an individual who is not sensitive to reciprocity may
perceive this merely as an initiative for the organization to become more efficient for the overall
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good of the company. Creating a measure to examine individual differences in sensitivity to
reciprocity, then testing such manipulations previously used, may provide more insight regarding
whether specific strategies of implementing such controls may be more effective than others.
Uncertainty is also an interesting aspect of intention of another’s actions (Douthit &
Stevens 2014, Brink, Green, and Kearney 2018). While ambiguous controls have a varying effect
over employees, this is a point of interest of further research to properly vet the implication of
controls utilized within an organization. Christ (2013) also demonstrates that the source of
control can dictate the reaction, i.e., reciprocal behavior one responds with. Table 1.4 shows a
collection of works discussing the dimension of intention and its role in reciprocity previously
researched.
[Insert Table 1.4 Here]
Attribution
Attribution theory has deep seeded roots in psychology history. Seminal work, such as
Freud (1894) describes an individuals’ ego and its ability to reject “unbearable ideas” that may
serve as a negative affect to ones’ self’, more simply stated, individuals have the tendency to not
have the ability to see objectively assess traits or events that cause them to feel as though they
have faults. Langer (1975) introduced the theory of the “illusion of control” in which one
attributes successes to their own action/abilities even in a scenario in which their success is
determined entirely by chance. These two sides of the theoretical coin form the basic construct of
attribution theory, in which an individual expects to attribute success to ones’ own accord, and
attribute a failure (i.e. stain on one’s ego) to external sources, or at least to causes that are not of
their own making.
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When addressing the construct of attribution and its relation to reciprocity, it is likely
most pertinent to explore ways in attribution affects interpersonal relationships. Many early
experiments show evidence for individuals largely possessing an “egocentric bias” in which they
overly attribute their own contribution in a collaborative relationship when there is an overall
successful outcome rather than a failure (Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelley 1981).
This “egocentric bias” is often measured from the perspective of an individual’s ability to form
an objective perspective on their individual contribution in relationship to the group level
outcome. (Ross and Sicoly. 1979; Rather and Heskowitz 1977). Having this uneven sense of
contribution towards success or failure causes individuals then to either believe that success is
attributed to their ability (Langer 1975), and therefore would likely cause the individual to feel
that they should either be recognized or rewarded for such. Conversely failure is not associated
to their efforts but rather an outside source and they should not receive punishment (Bartling and
Fishbacher 2011).
Attribution theory also takes a significant place in contractual agreements between parties
in which individuals believe that they feel entitled to specific rewards. Individuals assume that
their contributions lead to the group success, whether actual success arose from their own ability,
or merely success of the organization as a whole. Additionally, on the negative end of the
spectrum we see that individuals typically do not believe that they should receive punishment
despite potential responsibility for failure (Harvey and Weary 1984; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry
2012; Smith 1759; Greenwald 1980). Table 1.5 shows a collection of works discussing the
dimension of attribution and its role in reciprocity previously researched.
[Insert Table 1.5 Here]
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Reciprocity and its Role in Negotiation
Reciprocity plays a unique role in accounting literature where negotiation strategies must
be evaluated for effectiveness. Audit literature is of particular interest, as auditors must negotiate
revisions with clients in a manner that allows them to maintain professional integrity while
retaining a client’s favor. While Shaub (1996) conjectures that one of the primary dimensions of
reciprocity (trust) is a “threat” to an auditors’ independence, it has been shown that building a
reciprocal relationship can be a tactic employed by auditors to reach a successful outcome while
retaining professional integrity in the form of offering concessions and working collaboratively.
Early works have shown that specific negotiator style can create environments that are
either conducive to cooperation or non-collaborative. Druckman (1967) illustrated that dyadic
behavior has a substantial effect in situations of collective bargaining. Individuals predisposed to
strategy before entering a bargaining situation are found to be more hardened in their resolve and
therefore less likely to act as a collective. Conversely, individuals who engage in collective
behavior, such as information sharing rather than competitive behavior, are more likely to be met
with positive reciprocity in decision making, leading to a greater chance of concessions between
parties (Putnam 1990).
Prior Literature
In the context of client-auditor negotiations, reciprocity plays a key role in determining
concessions. While auditors, by nature, tend to be more conservative when making decisions,
reciprocity takes hold when multiple subsequent accounting issues are brought to light
throughout an audit engagement, a collection of previous works have been compiled in Table
1.6. (Gibbins et al. 2001). Reciprocity suggests that one party will make concessions when a
second party acts in kind (Gouldner 1960). Therefore, resolutions on previous issues between the
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client and auditor may affect their subsequent interactions (Hatfield and Mullis 2015; Gibbins et
al. 2001). Due to the negotiation aspect of client-auditor relations, reciprocity may be a strategy
for auditors to implement when attempting to reach resolutions that do not damage
professionalism while maintaining positive relations with their client. For example, Sanchez et
al. (2007) explored a “concession approach,” where they were able to show the effectiveness of a
negotiation strategy in which the auditor made salient their concessions of inconsequential items
found during the audit engagement. These concessions, in turn, created a perception of positive
reciprocity between the auditor and the client which was returned by an increased likelihood of
the client posting more significant income decreasing adjustments while at the same time
preserving positive customer relations.
Research such as Hatfield and Mullis (2015) may be a fruitful stepping point to tie in
with research involving investor reactions. Certainly, auditor concessions aid in more
trustworthy decisions by investors where adjustments are not needed. This waterfall effect of
auditor trust leading to investor trust would be an interval study that could improve the scope of
not only accounting research but also finance and economics.
Collaborative actions are also found to be more likely to meet with concession (Pruitt and
Carnevale 1993; Druckman 1967). Therefore, it is beneficial for auditors to take advantage of
reciprocity-based strategies to more easily reach agreement during the negotiation phase of an
audit engagement (Hatfield et al. 2008), especially where both parties have the tendency to feel a
sense of a win-lose outcome, i.e., there are no outcomes possible in which both parties are able to
mutually benefit (Putnam 1990). While this collaborative strategy has shown to effectively
improve negotiations between clients and auditors, in a scenario in which a client acts in a
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contentious (i.e., non-reciprocal) manner, an auditor’s experience is able to mediate negotiations
where reciprocity does not prevail (Fu et al. 2011).
Reciprocity-based audit negotiation strategies, such as the concession approach, seem to
be a direct result of the regulatory environment created by SAS No. 89 (AICPA [1999]) and
Sarbanes-Oxley, which allow for both concession and no-concession approaches to fall under
compliant reporting. This indicates that regulators were able to see the benefits of creating an
atmosphere in which auditors and clients could work in an environment which fosters positive
reciprocity and subsequent cooperation in situations where auditors deem concession items to be
inconsequential, while retaining the ability to preserve professional integrity.
While in many cases trust is seen as a catalyst for positive reciprocity, auditors must be
vigilant regarding the potential for fraud. As relationships between auditors and clients lengthen
over time, concerns arise as to auditors’ ability to maintain professional skepticism (Kerler and
Killough 2009). However, while auditors increase their levels of trust for their clients, this does
not seem to affect an auditor’s skepticism; further, auditors with increased experience and
training are able to temper their levels of trust given to employees (Shaub 1996). Hatfield (2010)
shows evidence of this in that previous concessions made by clients create feelings of reciprocity
with their auditor, shaping the outcome of current-period negotiations tilting final decisions in
favor of the client.
Direction for Future Research
Much of the research involving the role of reciprocity within negotiations involves
experiments that employ a single-round decision. This may not fully reflect how reciprocity
takes place during the relationship between an audit firm and its client, as many of these
relationships last over many years. It may, therefore, be of interest to utilize a repeated-round
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engagement to see the effects of time over the relationship. Not only could we examine whether
engagement pairs become more collaborative or potentially contentious over engagements, also
to what extent a relationship can be contentious before terminating the engagement. Another
potential area of research could stem from auditor rotation rules. Potentially, a change from an
auditor-client relation from one that is reciprocal in nature to one that is not could have adverse
effects or vice-versa. Table 1.6 shows a collection of works discussing the dimension of
reciprocity and its role in economic negotiation previously researched.
[Insert Table 1.6 Here]
CONCLUSION
In each field of behavioral accounting research, we see that reciprocity is utilized in
multiple fashions. Reciprocity could increase productivity, honesty, and trust as we see in
management studies. Reciprocity is also a potentially useful tool for assisting in negotiations.
Auditors are likely to foster positive reciprocity to complete their responsibilities better.
However, reciprocity may have dangerous effects if used to facilitate practices that are not
ethical or in the best interest of a firm’s stakeholders, such as what might occur when auditors or
managers allow so much trust that they are taken advantage of. While trust contracts in
participative budgeting can potentially provide accurate and timely information, agency theory
prevails to a certain extent, although individuals tend to not take advantage of private
information. Likewise, while showing signs of trust is viewed as a detriment to auditors’
independence, reciprocal behavior can allow them to better perform a successful audit
engagement.
Because of these various interaction styles and implications dependent on each form of
relationship, we must understand how reciprocity plays a role in the accounting literature. As
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highlighted throughout this paper, many unanswered questions remain. This paper serves as a
spotlight of where we have been, where we are now, and where we need to reach toward for
future research in reciprocity and its role in accounting literature.

29

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

PAPER TWO: DEVELOPMENT OF A SCALE TO MEASURE SENSITIVITY TO
RECIPROCITY

ABSTRACT
The concept of “reciprocity” states that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish
unkind behaviors. This paper examines reciprocity as a multidimensional trait in which
individuals possess varying levels of sensitivity. I hypothesize that reciprocity can be observed as
a trait condition (stable throughout time) as well as a state condition (one that is enacted due to a
momentary stimulus). Furthermore, individual dimensions of reciprocity are measurable and
vary across individuals, and they may provide predictable behavioral responses. Prior accounting
research has primarily focused on the overall effects of state-induced conditions through varying
external influence. This dissertation attempts to develop a measure of reciprocity, using three
behavioral dimensions: preferences for distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between
parties, and perceptions of the intention underlying another’s actions.
I first developed a survey to measure an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity by
utilizing the three above dimensions underlying reciprocal actions. Multiple survey samples were
used to create a final 14-item scale to measure an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity.
However, the fit indices for this model did not meet desired levels of goodness of fit. Further,
this model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic setting. I end this dissertation with a
discussion of potential implications for future research and describe how this may open a
conversation into furthering our understanding of the theory of reciprocity.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of “reciprocity” states that individuals will reward kind behaviors and punish
unkind behaviors (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). While reciprocity suggests that individuals
evaluate kind actions, they also consider the underlying intentions of the action. Prior behavioral
studies have observed reciprocity through the implementation of numerous manipulations,
varying in both methodologies and theoretical underpinnings. Generally, these studies have
attempted to explain the causes of positive or negative behavior between subordinates and
superiors. Due to variations in the independent variables previously manipulated, it is possible to
extend prior reciprocity research. I propose that due to various manipulations used, there is an
inherent motivation to examine the effects of three major behavioral dimensions identified in
prior reciprocal behavior studies within an accounting setting. Previous literature finds that
varying levels of reciprocal reactions are dependent on the utilized experimental manipulations
(Christ 2013; Fisher et al. 2015; Davidson 2013). This paper extends prior research by
attempting to develop a measure of sensitivity to reciprocity, using three behavioral dimensions
that may predict the strength of a behavior response. These dimensions include preferences for
distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between parties, and perceptions of the intention
underlying another’s actions. Therefore, I examine individuals’ varying levels of reciprocal
response to interactions. These interactions often take place in principal-agent scenarios when an
organization attempts to either control destructive behavior or induce positive behavior34. This

3

Principal agent scenarios occur when an agent makes decisions on behalf of their principal. It is expected that the
agent will make decisions in the best interest of the principal. With inherent information asymmetry, agents are in
the position of making decisions that benefit their own wealth at the detriment of the principal. Often these scenarios
also use participant titles such as superior and subordinate, or manager and employee interchangeably.
4
Often seen through dependent measures of levels of a subordinate’s effort or honesty, and a manager’s likelihood
to impose a control.
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study could become a useful tool for future experimentation dealing with reciprocal behavior, not
only when examining new, unique experimental manipulations such as fairness, lack of trust, or
perceived intention, but also, the potential for replicating previous studies to glean more
information about participants’ reactions.
An organization may run more efficiently when superiors are able to delegate decisions
to their subordinates. A primary purpose of delegation is to take advantage of subordinates’
ability to act swiftly and utilize their specialized knowledge due to the proximity to the decision.
For example, when organizations use participative budgeting practices, where granular
information is required, a subordinate’s role may put them in a better position to make successful
decisions (Rankin et al. 2008). These practices assume that the organization can place a
reasonable level of trust in those making efficient local budget decisions. While the practice of
participative budgeting aids many organizations, the potential for information asymmetry
(information possessed by subordinates that is not readily available to their superior), allows
subordinates to benefit by taking advantage of the potential information asymmetry (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger 2004; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010; Pepper and Gore 2015).
While organizations and those in superior roles are widely known to implement controls
as a measure to prevent a subordinate from engaging in devious behavior (Zimmerman 2006),
previous literature finds tension when examining the overall benefits of controls (Christ 2013;
Christ et al. 2008; Rankin et al. 2008; Coletti, Sedatol and Towry 2005). Additionally, a growing
body of research has investigated potential detriments arising from subordinates acting on their
perceptions of “why controls are implemented” and the “source of implementation.” This
perception of source and purpose can lead to a subordinate’s feeling of either positive or negative
reciprocity induced by a superior implementing controls (Falk and Kossel 2006; Christ et al.
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2008). Prior reciprocity studies have shown that individuals respond to kind acts with kind
behavior, and conversely, individuals respond to unkind acts with unkind behavior (Fisher et al.
2015; Fehr and Gachter 1998, 2000; Fehr, Ernst, and Gachter 2002). Under the concept of
reciprocity, controls implemented by superiors intending to inhibit negative behavior may induce
negative reactions from those who feel they are under scrutiny. For example, superiors may
implement controls to limit subordinates’ ability to report budget expectations in excess of actual
predicted or known budget requirements (i.e., to limit budgetary slack).5 Subordinates may
perceive controls in this setting as the superior demonstrating a lack of trust. If so, subordinates
may respond with destructive behaviors, such as an increase in dishonest activities or lack of
effort (Christ 2013). One purpose of implementing controls is to reduce the monetary costs of
subordinates’ potential unethical behavior. Reciprocity considers the social costs arising from
creating an environment where perception may create a caustic relationship between
subordinates and organizations (Von Siemens 2013; Falk and Kossel 2006).
This paper examines different dimensions that create an individual’s sensitivity to
reciprocity, by categorizing subjects into specific types. In this study, sensitivity to reciprocity is
defined as the magnitude of response to either positive or negative interactions between two
parties. Previous literature suggests that three primary dimensions comprise an individual’s
reciprocal reactions: preferences for distributional fairness, perceptions of trust between parties,
and perceptions of the intention underlying another’s actions.6 I use the three dimensions to
develop a measurement scale for individuals’ trait sensitivity to interactions that cause states of
5

Budgetary slack occurs within principle agent scenarios when the agent has access to private information which
they can utilize to increase their retained wealth through the process of reporting budgets to allocate more assets to
themselves at the detriment of the principle.
6
Initially there were four dimensions identified, distributional fairness, trust, intention, and attribution. However,
tests indicated that individuals have difficulty disentangling attribution from intention, therefore the final three
dimensions of distributional fairness, trust, and intention were kept.
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heightened reciprocity. The development of this scale begins by identifying manipulations used
in previous studies that have effectively utilized the three key dimensions of reciprocity.
Manipulations used in previous studies are then adapted to develop survey questions. Items from
two previously developed personality trait surveys relating to distributional fairness, trust, and
intention are also used. These two sources lead to an initial list of 126 potential survey items.
I used a series of steps to reduce the initial set of 126 items into a more parsimonious
scale by first engaging in a literature search, generating a sample of items, then purifying the
measure (Churchill 1979; Watson and Clark 1995; Hurtt 2010; Ashton and Lee 2014; Watson
and Clark 1999). Subsets of trait dimensions were developed using the three identified
dimensions. The subsets allow the creation of a more manageable list of items to implement for
initial testing. For example, within the dimension “intention,” four subsets come to focus,
including anger, impulsiveness, reaction to control, and reaction to feedback. The items were
checked to make certain that approximately an equal number of items represented each of
subsets of the four original dimensions.
The process resulted in a reduced scale of 45 items. A doctoral-level group trained in
behavioral studies pre-tested the refined list of 45 items. These individuals participated in a Qsort survey through Qualtrics. The objective of the Q-sort exercise was to identify whether the
participants perceived each item to be representative of the intended dimension and create a
survey to deploy via MTurk for three subsequent factor analyses.
This study gathered data from a total of 4787 participants, using Amazon Mechanical

7

This number excludes participants who were removed from the study due to not being within the U.S. or who
attempted to participate twice. The information for exclusion was based on a review of IP addresses provided by
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
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Turk8 (MTurk) in conjunction with Qualtrics. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted within
two survey groups to bring an initial item list of 41 items, down to a reduced scale of 19 based
factor loadings of items on each underlying dimension to confirm the validity of the reciprocity
scale created. Finally, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted from a third MTurk
recruitment to reduce the scale further to a final 14-item measure of sensitivity to reciprocity.
However, the fit indices for this scale did not meet desired levels of goodness of fit. Further, this
model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic setting.
The measure of reciprocity developed in this study provides an initial step into
developing a tool that allows one to measure individual differences of sensitivity to reciprocity.
However, the results indicate that further work is needed to refine this measure. An increased
understanding of reciprocity will also lead to practical implications, for example, organizations’
ability to design effective controls that reduce subordinates’ destructive reciprocal behaviors,
such as budgetary slack or reduced levels of effort within the context of participative budgeting.
Further, businesses may be able to take effective actions if they are able to take inventory of an
individual’s trait reciprocity. The values of an individual’s inventory items and a subordinates’
perception would allow companies to predict how controls affect an individual’s reciprocity. For
example, an organization may be able to examine individual traits and design a more effective
incentive system. Prior literature indicates that individuals’ response to a bonus offer may

8

While Amazon Mechanical Turk does have difficulties, crowdsourcing information has shown to be an effective
method in lieu of traditional methods. Hunt (2015) has compiled a comprehensive roadmap to effectively deploy
surveys that can be applicable for behavioral studies. Much of which garnered from studies assessing demographics
and applicableness (Ipeirotis 2010; Ross, Zaldivar, Irani, and Tomlinson 2009; Paolacci et al. 2010; Berinsky,
Huber, Lenz, 2012; Brandon, Long, Loras, Mueller-Phillips, Vansant 2013; Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014; Peer
et al. 2015; Horton, Rand, Zeckhauser 2011; Mason and Suri 2012; Winter and Suri 2012).
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depend on their perception of the reason for the bonus. An organization may offer a bonus to be
competitive, or with the company’s intent to show goodwill toward employees (Choi 2014).
Further, additional research on the constructs underlying reciprocity will facilitate our
ability to empirically tease apart varying explanations for observed behaviors. For example, if a
superior’s review is implemented in which the subordinate is under periodic scrutiny for their
behavior, subordinates could perceive it differently based on their perceptions of the superior’s
intention. A subordinate who is not particularly sensitive to reciprocity may perceive the control
as being implemented for the well-being of the organization, and its implementation is a
necessary action the superior must undertake. Conversely, a subordinate who is highly sensitive
to reciprocity, especially within the dimension of intention and trust, could perceive that control
implementation indicates a lack of trust from the superior. In turn, the subordinate is likely to
respond with destructive and or dishonest behavior. If both types of subordinates are present, the
overall effectiveness of the control may be unclear without the ability to measure and control for
individual differences in sensitivity to reciprocity.
DIMENSIONS OF RECIPROCITY
To design a scale to measure reciprocity, we must first identify dimensions on which
reciprocity is based (Churchill 1979; Clark and Watson 1998). While many behavioral
accounting studies draw upon reciprocity to predict or explain observed behaviors, they often use
other dimensions to explain or manipulate reciprocal effects. The key recurring dimensions that
underline reciprocity are those of preferences for distributional fairness, trust between parties,
and perceptions of the intention underlying the other party’s actions (hereafter distributional
fairness, trust, and intention). Reciprocity is not, however, singularly interchangeable with any of
these three dimensions. Reciprocity is a response to these dimensions in various combinations,
36

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

rather than a purely altruistic or punitive behavior. Sensitivity to reciprocity is the magnitude of
reciprocal response to an interaction between two parties. Given the intertwined nature of the
dimensions of reciprocity, all three dimensions are utilized in this study to create a
comprehensive measure. For example, subordinates may perceive that a superior’s actions are an
indication of negative intent and result in a lack of distributional fairness. They may reciprocate
with negative behaviors. Reciprocity can also incorporate strategic adjustment of one’s behavior
due to others’ anticipated response. For example, a superior may offer certain incentives
strategically to encourage a positive reciprocal reaction from subordinates.
To develop this measure, I focus on the specific weights an individual places on the
importance of distributional fairness, trust, and intention. Because of the Q-sort results outlined
in a subsequent section of the measurement design, the fourth dimension, attribution, was
removed for this study due to the inability to effectively parse out these items. The importance
placed on each dimension allows for ex-ante predictions of differences in individual reactions to
state-inducing interactions. Responses in the form of actions to these combined dimensions are
key to reciprocity. Previous literature defines reciprocity as the expectation that individuals will
reward kind behaviors and punish unkind behavior. In the following section, I summarize key
examples of observed reciprocal interactions within each dimension. For each dimension, the
expected responses of individuals with varying levels of sensitivity to that dimension are
explained.
Distributional Fairness
One dimension that underlies observed reciprocal actions is distributional fairness, which
refers to an individual’s propensity to feel discomfort due to a perceived lack of fairness between
parties interacting with one another (Douthit and Stevens 2014; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton
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and Ockenfels 2000). For contextualization in behavioral research, we can define distributional
fairness more specifically as perceptions of distributed wealth among individuals within a
community. When wealth is unevenly distributed, there is an increased likelihood that
individuals reciprocate by acting in a manner that attempts to restore a sense of equilibrium
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). When individuals are in a position in which they have a
great deal more wealth than another party, they may act to distribute a portion of their own
wealth to the other party to restore a sense of balance (Ben-Ner 2004; Kagel and Roth 1995;
Hoffman et al. 1994; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Bolton et al. 1998). Individuals typically do not
take full advantage of self-interested opportunities arising from competitive markets, because
maintaining equilibrium in markets benefits the overall wealth all parties (Fehr et al. 1998; Fehr
et al.1993). However, when individuals within an exchange are perceived to act overly
opportunistically, other players tend to respond negatively. For example, individuals perceived to
be acting opportunistically may receive punishment from those with whom they are interacting
(Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr et al. 1997; Fehr, Ernst and Riedl 1993). Similarly, within the
scope of market interactions, if a seller in a market acts in a monopolistic fashion, consumers
will likely reciprocate by engaging in trade with players not acting in such an individual manner
(Rabin 1993; Kahneman et al. 1986; Carnegie 1889), thus reducing the opportunistic seller’s
wealth, even to the detriment of the purchasers (usually in the form of higher costs).
Distributional fairness concerns also lead to a strategic adjustment of individuals’
behavior due to the response they anticipate they will receive. Individuals tend to make decisions
that do not distribute available excess wealth to themselves in participative budgeting settings
(Evans et al. 2001; Brown et al. 2009; Young 1985; Waller 1988; Chow et al.). This behavior
may occur when an individual engages in trade decisions as purchasers. In a brainstorming
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bargaining strategy study, purchasers who are primed to consider the vendor’s position adjust
their behavior to favor distributional fairness. They act more cooperatively with vendors due to
the increased saliency of both participants’ outcomes (Maxwell et al. 1999). Additionally, when
a vendor acts unfairly, purchasers respond with negative reciprocity in the form of uncooperative
interactions (Maxwell et al. 2003).
The most profound effects from individuals reacting to deeds that promote distributional
fairness, or lack thereof, is the relationship between superiors and subordinates. A key concept in
this area is fairness of pay to subordinates. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) demonstrate distributional
fairness in their fair wage-effort theory, which states that subordinates who are paid under a level
they perceive to be a fair wage will respond negatively in the form of exerting lower levels of
effort. This response can be interpreted as subordinates behaving in a manner they perceive as
equalizing the wealth they provide to the organization in response to the wealth they receive.
Predicted Responses to Distributional Fairness
Distributional fairness concerns indicate an individual’s desire to act in a way that
restores balance, or parity, between parties exchanging wealth (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof and
Yellen 1988, 1990). High sensitivity to distributional fairness would be predictive of various
types of behavior primarily dependent on the initially established equilibrium between the
parties. First, individuals who possess high sensitivity to distributional fairness would be more
willing to give up their own wealth if they believe others within an exchange are being given a
lesser share. Conversely, the same individuals would be more likely to act in a way that punishes
those within an exchange who are not behaving fairly, even if they sacrifice their own wealth
(Fehr et al. 1998; Rabin 1993). If individuals possess a low sensitivity toward distributional
fairness, we would expect behavior similar to that predicted under economic agency theory.
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Specifically, individuals will put little consideration into what is fair when making decisions and
will behave in a way that maximizes their own wealth. Figure 2 illustrates how individuals with
varying levels of sensitivity to distributional fairness are expected to reciprocate to high and low
levels of distributional fairness.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Trust
Trust between parties is a second dimension underlying observed reciprocal actions.
Bradach and Eccles (1989, 104) define trust as “a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that
one's exchange partner will act opportunistically.” To illustrate how trust relates to reciprocity,
we can examine an interaction between a superior and subordinate in a participative budgeting
scenario. In this example, a superior may or may not demonstrate that he or she trusts a
subordinate, and the subordinate reciprocates9. If a superior’s actions indicate that he or she
trusts the subordinate, a subordinate may respond in a reciprocal manner by acting with
increased levels of honesty. This honesty benefits the superior. However, if the superior shows
signs of distrust, many times in the form of implementing additional controls such as a hurdle
contract, the subordinate may no longer view the decision as one of an ethical dilemma. This
removes from the subordinate any inherent disutility felt by acting dishonestly (Evans 2001 et
al.; Rankin et al. 2008)10.
In contrast, superiors may reciprocate with actions that demonstrate lower levels of trust
when they perceive subordinates acting in a dishonest manner. Superiors may be willing to go so

9

Because honesty is generally utilized in accounting experiments as a dependent variable based on a trust
manipulation, the focus of this dimension is trust.
10
A hurdle contract is one utilized in participative budgeting that introduces a fixed limit on what a subordinate is
able to submit project budgets for.
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far as to forego their own wealth creation by rejecting a dishonest budget (Schatzberg and
Stevens 2008). Superior and subordinate wealth generation is typically zero for both parties in
the case of a rejected budget. Here, traditional economic theory would predict that the superior
should accept all projects. Budget rejection, however, may be justified to punish dishonest
behavior and prevent future acts of dishonesty (Rankin et al. 2008, Falk and Kosfeld 2006).
The misuse of private information occurs within participative budgeting scenarios where
the subordinate has incentives to create budgetary slack. Budgetary slack occurs when a budget
requests amounts greater than needed to attain an organization’s goals. Budgetary slack increases
subordinates’ wealth while simultaneously reducing the wealth of the superior. Traditional
economic theory predicts that a subordinate will create as much slack as they can to maximize
their own wealth. An individual’s actions are often consistent with preferences that include a
utility for honesty (Brown et al. 2009). Evans et al. (2001), a seminal study, experimentally
examined subordinates engaged within a trust contract where the organization gave full decision
power to subordinates, while submitting budget reports based on private information. Under
these conditions, negative repercussions are limited, even if subordinates acted in a selfinterested manner, taking full advantage of the inherent information asymmetry to increase their
wealth. Evans’ (2001) results indicated that subordinates still acted in a partially honest fashion
when trusted by the principal, despite the limited economic downside of acting dishonestly. One
interpretation of these results is that the agents’ actions were consistent with a demonstration of
positive reciprocity in response to trust exhibited by the organization. Christ (2013) also
documented that subordinates reciprocate with destructive behaviors to controls they perceive
superiors implemented due to lack of trust. This behavior would occur even if the purpose of the
controls was to improve reporting accuracy.
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Predicted Responses to Trust
If individuals in a position of trust by a superior have a positive predisposition toward
trust, we would expect that, regardless of their ability to do so, they would not take advantage of
a situation to increase their own wealth. This behavior contrasts with predictions made under
traditional economic agency theory (Evans et al. 2001). If individuals are not trust-sensitive, we
would expect that they would take actions to increase their own wealth, with little regard for the
act of the principle fully entrusting them. Figure 3 illustrates how individuals reciprocate
behavior with low to high levels of sensitivity to trust.
Choi (2014) additionally explores bonus offers within the dimension of trust in
accounting literature. Choi examines whether a sign of goodwill is positively reciprocated, using
context as a major prediction factor. Specifically, an employer offers a signing bonus to
demonstrate its increased belief in trusting the employee. Choi finds the act of the employer
conveying to the employee that there is an excess of available workers compounds the goodwill
context. Choi demonstrates that the employer does not necessarily need to offer a bonus to entice
a new hire to accept its offer.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Intention
A third dimension underlying observed reciprocal actions is the perceived intention
underlying the other party’s actions. Intention is an individual’s perception of the reason for
another party’s actions (Falk and Kosfield 2006; Falk and Fischbacher 2006; Rabin 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Blout 1995; Falk et al. 2000, 2003; Charness 2004; Charness
and Rabin 2002). Without an individual’s perception of a second party’s intention, there would
be little basis for a reciprocal action to take place. Simply put, if an individual believes that a
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person acts toward them with neither positive nor ill intention, the individual would perceive the
act as innocuous. Reciprocation would neither be positive nor negative behavior without context
altering the perceived act. Intention may overlap with the other dimensions discussed in prior
sections, as the perception may be that the underlying intention was to indicate trust or distrust
(Falk and Kosfield 2006; Falk and Fischbacher 2006), or it may be that the perceived intent is to
create distributional fairness.
The relation between intention and reciprocal actions is demonstrated in the behavioral
accounting literature primarily in cases of participative budgeting where a superior is able to
impose control over a subordinate. Christ (2013), discussed briefly in the prior section, observed
that subordinate reactions to a control implementation are contingent on the perceived intentions
underlying that implementation. She examined whether subordinates perceive the control as
intentionally implemented due to a superior’s lack of trust. Christ reports negative reciprocity is
more likely to occur than if such perceived intention is absent. Economic studies also examine
individuals’ ability to manipulate perceived intention to increase their wealth. For example,
Rabin (1993) finds that suppliers can act in a non-self-serving manner to induce positive
reciprocal behavior from purchasers, thereby increasing their return of wealth. This study
indicates that anticipation of potential negative reciprocity has the ability to direct individuals’
decisions.
Intentionality also influences reciprocal actions in response to employment contracts. A
new hire’s subsequent effort and likelihood to accept a job offer may be a reciprocal response to
the perceived intention of the employer in creating certain aspects of the employment contract.
Choi (2014) examines whether the perception of a bonus was an intentional signal of trust or
merely a tactic to entice potential new hires to accept a job offer. In the scenario introduced by
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Choi, both the perception of another’s motives (i.e., intention) and an individual’s perception of
self-worth and deservedness of a bonus contract (i.e., attribution) are involved in determining the
reciprocal action11. Individuals who perceived a potential bonus offer as an intentional signal of
trust were more likely to exhibit higher levels of effort once the position was accepted than those
who believed it was a necessity for the employer to obtain a new hire.
Predicted Responses for to Intention
Christ (2013) examined individuals’ increased sensitivity to intention (i.e., a
predisposition that intensifies reactions dependent on a perceived intention from another), where
activities could be perceived to contain negative connotations. In the presence of negative
connotations (i.e., a direct control put in place by a superior acting in a self-serving manner),
individuals should act in a far more destructive manner than with activities that are ambiguous or
indirect (Christ 2013). Conversely, if individuals have lower sensitivity to intention (i.e., a
predisposition that lessens reactions dependent on a perceived intention from another), they
should be less likely to exhibit reciprocal behavior. Figure 4 illustrates how individuals with
varying levels of sensitivity to intention are expected to respond to acts perceived to be positive
or negative12.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]

11

Intention and attribution (see figure 5) are often closely related in this research. As such, attribution theory had
been explored as a possible fourth dimension for the reciprocity measure developed in this study. However, pilot
study results indicated that individuals found it hard to distinguish between intention and attribution items.
Therefore, I focus on intention in this study and discuss potential follow up investigations to examine whether or not
these two dimensions are able to be fully disentangled within the context of reciprocity.
12
This perception is manipulated by adjusting the new hire market as being either scarce or inflated.

44

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Developing an Initial Item Pool
Once the dimensions underlying reciprocity have been defined, Churchill (1979) and
Clark and Watson (1995) suggest collecting an initial pool of items to measure the dimensions
by utilizing previous measures of similar or identical dimension traits. Building upon procedures
described by Churchill (see Figure 6), I compiled an initial collection of 126 items (see Table 3).
Each was formatted into a five-point Likert scale, ranging from one, “strongly disagree,” to five,
“strongly agree.” The compiled items indicate either an increase or decrease in sensitivity to one
of the three previously outlined dimensions: distributional fairness, trust, or intention. Of these
126 items, 48 were adapted from the HEXACO-PI-R scale, (Ashton and De Vries 2014). This
scale measures various personality traits, many of which parallel the three dimensions chosen for
this measurement development.13 An examination of previously validated definitions,
manipulations, and measures from prior accounting studies identified 78 additional items.
Reciprocal behaviors such as control implementation, participative budgeting, and contract
negotiation are directly related to these items.14 Specifically, the following studies were
identified and used to create items for this scale: Christ (2013), Choi (2014), Douthit and Stevens
(2015), Schatzberg and Stevens (2008), Fisher et al. (2015), Linderbaum and Levey (2010), Ke
and Yu (2006), Ho et. al. (2018), Evans et al. (2001), Douthit (2017), Lowe and Recker (1994),

13

This design is similar to the design in Peer et. al 2014, which tests multiple measures on Amazon Mechanical
Turk including the “Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), Rosenberg’s 10item Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1979), the short, 18-item form of the Need for Cognition scale (NFC;
Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984), and the short, 10-item form of the Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Fischer
& Fick, 1993).” The goal of which was to confirm data sufficiency from participant reputations.
14
These are amongst those that are most affected by reciprocal actions (see the literature review portion of this
dissertation for more discussion on this issue).
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Fehr and Hatcher (1993).15 Table 2 identifies definitions provided by these studies for the three
primary dimensions and indicates the studies used to develop items for each dimension.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
[Insert Table 3 Here]
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
I first identified relevant items and key measures used in prior studies. Next, I converted
the identified items into the format necessary to develop this study’s reciprocity scale. For
example, Christ (2013) manipulated the saliency of a control to direct the subordinate’s attention
to the source of the control, and implemented at three levels, endogenous (direct), exogenous
(indirect), and uncertain. The study found that participants who were able to directly link the
control to their superior felt the control to be a signal of distrust and reciprocated with lower
levels of effort. To convert this manipulation to a scale item, I have operationalized it with a
question, such as “I am likely to exert less’ (more) effort under circumstances in which process
controls are (are not) explicitly outlined by my direct superior.” Each item is coded according to
the underlying dimension being manipulated by the study (e.g., intention) and the relevant
dependent variables expected to be affected in the study (e.g., effort and trust). Further, where
possible, I have noted possible language variations such as “less/more” and “are/are not” (as in
the above example). This results in two separate potential questions, one stated positively, and
one stated negatively, enabling the use of reverse scoring to both increase the pool of available

15

To determine whether each study was appropriate for inclusion, journal rankings are considered based on Brigham
Young University (BYU) and Scimago Journal & Country Rank. These rankings examine where the specific
experiment was published, or if one of the contributing authors has previously published in a higher tier journal
(http://www.scimagojr.com).
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questions and protect from the possibility of dimension under-representation, a key threat to
validity (Hurtt 2010; Messick 1995)16.
Several questions were developed to ensure items were not directionally ambiguous.
These questions addressed the same underlying research question in more direct terms. For
example, some items were adapted from Linderbaum and Levey (2010). One of the original
items was “I feel self-assured when dealing with feedback.” This item measures intention
regarding how one assesses feedback for their efforts but lacks directional clarity for measuring
positive or negative reciprocity. Therefore, this item was adjusted as follows: “I feel self-assured
when dealing with negative feedback.” The modified item allows for a better assessment of a
dimension of intention (Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979). Those who are sensitive
to such a measure are more likely to disavow negative feedback as it conflicts with their
perception of self-assurance.
Refining the Pool of Potential Items
To test my initial pool of questions for content validity, I reviewed my initial scale with
an expert well established in participative budgeting from Virginia Commonwealth University,
similar to DeVellis (2016). The reviewed examined clarity and redundancy between the items
and assessed their efficiency. The goal was to reduce the initial pool of 126 questions to a more
manageable size for future experimental study (Hurtt 2010). To do so, the questions were
separated into four groups based on their underlying dimensions: distributional fairness, trust,
intention, and attribution. Items were first paired down by removing questions that showed
redundancies to a shorter list of 80 (20 items per dimension). I then analyzed the text of items

16

Whether the items are positive or negative, stronger responses still indicate an increased sensitivity to reciprocity
because reciprocity acts as a duality in regards to the behavior it can incite refining
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within these dimensions for recurring themes within each dimension group, this provided two to
five unique underlying themes within each dimension which further removed redundancies. For
example, within the dimension of intention, the common underlying themes in the items were
found to be four, including anger, impulsiveness, controls, and feedback. To make certain that
each of these underlying themes were properly represented, two to three questions from each
theme was chosen. This process resulted in a reduced pool of 45 items (14 for ‘trust’, 10 for
‘distributional fairness’, 10 for ‘intention’, and 11 for ‘attribution’).17 The writing for most of the
items was at a 7th-9th grade level per the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s
specifications (ahrq.gov). The items average nine words each, and approximately half of these
items will be reverse-coded. Table 4 lists these items along with their intended primary
dimension.
The relation between the pool of 45 items and the underlying dimensions was then
assessed using a Q-sort function deployed through Qualtrics. This initial examination uses Q-sort
as it provides “the extent of agreement among people in the way in which concepts are employed
can be assessed” (Block 1961). I asked a panel of individuals consisting of professors, graduate
students, and undergraduate students from various universities to complete the Q-sort task.
Participants were given brief definitions of the four dimensions included in Q-sort to ensure that
they used the same base definitions.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
To confirm that these definitions were clear, words potentially above an elementary level
were hyperlinked to a Merriam-Webster Dictionary that provides either a direct definition or a

17

Up to this point the study still utilized four dimensions: distributional fairness, trust, intention, and attribution.
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synonym. The panel was tasked with sorting the 45 items (appearing in random order for each
participant) into each of the four dimensions. I assessed the clarity of the match between the
individual items and the intended underlying dimensions after the exercise was completed by the
participants whom were recruited for the task. The number of clicks each individual made was
tracked by coding the Qualtrics instrument. Analyzing the number of clicks provides information
about any terms that are potentially confusing to participants. Once complete, Q-sort statistics
indicated items for which there was most consensus from participants in identifying the
underlying dimension.
Using Q-sort data, I analyzed the 45 items to identifying which items best represent each
of the underlying dimensions.18 All items were examined to determine if they had high levels of
participants’ agreement, indicating that the item captured the intended dimension. The results
indicated cross overs between multiple items that were intended to represent attribution and the
dimensions of intention and distributional fairness. After reviewing these items, it was
determined that questions created with the intent to capture attribution either had insufficient
agreement between participants or loaded more heavily on other dimensions. Therefore,
attribution was removed entirely. The initial pool of 126 items was revisited, and an additional 5
items that were both clear and closely followed the themes found within the remaining three
dimensions were added. Specifically, two items were added to capture the dimension of trust,
and two items were added for the dimension of distributional fairness. This adjustment to the
scale resulted in a scale of 41 items19.

18
19

For comparison, the professional skepticism scale developed by Hurtt (2010) consists of 32 items.
45-11 items removed for attribution, and 5 additional chosen from the previous pool of 126.
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Testing the Reduced Scale
The development of the scale using MTurk was conducted in three phases. Each phase is
described in detail in the following sections.
First Phase of Scale Development
I administered the reduced 41 item scale using Qualtrics deployed through Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The increasing use of MTurk has provided a rich source of survey
data from experimental participants for studies in the accounting literature (Farrell et al. 2016;
Koonce et al. 2015; Rennekamp 2012). Additionally, MTurk is an efficient method to obtain
sufficient responses when using various factor analysis methods. This is true when using a
specific population such as accounting professionals or non-specialized populations that may be
required when developing general trait measures.
Prior literature indicates that four observations are required per item to obtain a sample
sufficient to have adequate power for factor analysis (Fabrigar et al. 1999). Thus, 41 items x 4
observations result in a minimum participant pool of 164 individuals. Survey items were
presented with five-point Likert-type response, ranging from one indicating “strongly disagree,”
to five indicating “strongly agree.” As some observations were found to be of poor quality, 180
individuals were recruited from MTurk (Hunt 2015).20 Participants were offered $1.00 to
complete the 41-item scale. This payment ensured that I attracted a proper amount of “engaged”
individuals. As the scale should take less than five minutes to complete, this pay rate exceeds
Amazon’s suggested rate of $6/hour ($1 for 10 minutes) for US workers (Amazon 2011; Hunt
2015).

20

Approval for recruiting participants through MTurk for all three factor analyses and student experiments were
approved through VCU’s Office of Research and Innovation IRB review panel (see Appendix 2 and 3).
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Within the MTurk task, no personal data was collected.21 I requested that participants
only consist of individuals within the U.S. to ensure that there weren’t major cultural differences
among participants which could skew responses further than intended.22 Within the survey two
questions were inserted at random points to confirm that participants were fluent in English.
These questions were posed as follows:
"Please complete this sentence
"I haven't got…"
○ no brothers or sisters.
○ brothers or sisters.
○ any brothers or sisters.
○ some brothers and sisters.
Please select the correct phrase
○ Always he arrives at 2:30
○ He arrives at always 2:30
○ He always arrives at 2:30
○ He always at 2:30 arrives

To ensure that the participants were engaged, two screening questions were embedded
within the survey to test whether individuals are mindful of their responses. These questions
instructed participants to “Please select ‘Neither agree nor disagree’” and “Please select the
answer ‘Green’”. The inclusion of these questions brought the total number of questions for the
survey to 45. Qualtrics was programmed to randomize the order of the individual items for
participants to avoid the potential for the data being skewed by order effects that might occur if
all participants saw the items in the same order. Basic demographic questions were asked at the
end of the instrument (i.e., gender, age, and education).

Unless specifically requested, participants’ personal information is not provided to individuals collecting data via
MTurk. Additional information on MTurk workers’ information security can be found at
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer_privacy?ie=UTF8&nodeId=468496.
22
A number of participants outside of the U.S. were able to participate despite the requirement that participants be a
native to the U.S.. All non-U.S. respondents were removed by locating each responder’s IP address to confirm their
location. Additionally, because each request for recruits were issued in batches of nine (additional fees are charged
by MTurk for requests over nine participants) there was a potential for participants to participant in multiple batches,
therefore any individuals who did so were also removed from the pool.
21
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After the survey data was collected, I examined responses using an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) utilizing maximum likelihood factor extraction including oblique rotation
(Fabrigar et al. 1999; Linderbaum and Levey 2010). EFA is used primarily as it allows items to
load on multiple factors. The three dimensions underlying the items are expected to build
towards an overarching theory of reciprocity. Therefore, I expected the factors to be related, but
it was necessary to examine whether items cross-loaded too heavily. The analysis was performed
in RStudio.23 Because this study is intended to examine potential differences in individual
sensitivities to reciprocity, this initial EFA extracted three factors. Also, EFA results indicated
whether any individual items appeared to have secondary loadings (Linderbaum and Levey
2010). It is anticipated that the primary item loadings within the three individual dimensions will
likely overlap, as they share some similarities. Table 5 shows factor loading results. This first
EFA was examined to identify items that loaded well on a primary dimension (> 0.5 factor
loading) with no secondary loadings > 0.3 on any secondary dimensions (Riggio et al. 2010;
Brown 2005).24
From this analysis, a fourth dimension appeared.25 Upon review of the five items that
loaded on this fourth dimension, the of length of a relationship between individuals was a
common theme. As this construct was not part of the initial design, these five items were
removed and a second EFA was conducted with the remaining 36 items (Osborne and Fitzpatrick
2012). Osborne and Fitzpatrick (2012) also suggests examining exploratory factor analyses in

23

R was utilized initially due to its ability to run both Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Factor
Analysis. All subsequent data analysis was developed via IBM SPSS.
24
For this initial analysis all items that loaded well on the original 3 factors were kept, leaving 36 items for the
secondary EFA to be conducted.
25
Analysis was done with RStudio to test for fit of a 4 factor, 3 factor, 2 factor and 1 factor model. Through this a
fourth dimension emerged.
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multiple forms, specifically allowing the EFA to take on varying numbers of factor loadings.
Appendix 1 presents the initial instrument used in MTurk.26
[Insert Table 5 Here]
Second Phase of Scale Development
A second data collection using Qualtrics deployed through MTurk was conducted with
the reduced scale of 36 items reduced scale. After removing any responses outside the U.S. and
potential duplicate entries, the final respondents totaled 144. This number of participants
fulfilled the previously stated requirement of four observations per item (4 x 36 = 144). I again
examined the results using an EFA utilizing an oblique rotation. I selected all items that loaded
well on a primary dimension ( > 0.5 factor loading) with no secondary loadings > 0.3 on any
secondary dimensions, and all other items were removed. This resulted in a further reduced scale
of 19 items.
Third Phase of Scale Development
Finally, I collected data a third time deploying a Qualtrics survey through MTurk, using
the new reduced 19 item scale. Marsh, Hau, Balla, and Grayson (1998) state that for a threedimension measure an estimated pool of 100 to 125 participants is sufficient. Consistent with this
guidance, I was left with a pool of 168 participants after removing any data that was unusable. I
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the resulting data. Initially, a three-factor model was
estimated to reflect the dimensions of “Trust” “Distributional Fairness” and “Intention”. This
analysis produced alpha values of 0.909, 0.582, and 0.587, respectively, as shown in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 Here]

26

All iterations of the MTurk surveys were identical in form, but the second and third surveys contained fewer items
due it item removal based on the exploratory factor analyses.
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Given the poor fit statistics for the three-factor model X² = 413.886, p < 0.001, CFI =
0.757, TLI = 0.719, RMSEA = 0.113 SRMR = 0.095) (see Table 6), a secondary confirmatory
factor analysis was conducted with a two-factor model. This model returned two factors
consisting of 14 items that aligned closely to the dimensions of “Trust” and “Distributional
Fairness” constructs, with alphas of 0.923 and 0.652, respectively (see Table 7) . Further,
estimation for the two-factor analysis resulted in the following values: X² = 305.528, p < 0.001,
CFI = 0.807, TLI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.134 SRMR = 0.087. These indices are below the
recommended level for a sufficient fit (e.g., Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Browne and Cudeck, 1992;
Riggio, et al. 2010). Thus, these results suggest that these items did not result in a multi-factor
model with adequate fit to represent sensitivity to reciprocity. However, the 14-item two-factor
model is slightly better than the anticipated three-factor model in terms of alphas and fit.
Analyses with the two-factor model and with each dimension individually are examined in
conjunction with a laboratory experiment, as described in the next section. A single dimension
model was analyzed using both “Trust” and “Distributional Fairness” independently and neither
of which showed strong results, returning values of : X² =151.37, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.863, TLI =
0.808, RMSEA = 0.198 SRMR = 0.060 and X² = 149.11, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.975, TLI = 0.959,
RMSEA = 0.047 SRMR = 0.044 respectively.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
[Insert Table 8 Here]
EXPERIMENT UTILIZING SENSITIVITY TO RECIPROCITY SCALE
I conducted further analyses in tandem with a previously validated experimental setting
designed to elicit reciprocal behaviors. Participants were students recruited from the
Experimental Laboratory for Economics and Business Research (ELEBR) volunteer database at
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Virginia Commonwealth University. Invitations to participate in the experiment were sent
through the ELEBR participant database. Volunteers signed up to complete an online survey,
followed by an experimental session at the ELEBR computer lab. Prior to participating in the
laboratory experiment, each participant was sent a link to complete the reciprocity measure via
Qualtrics. Once they completed the reciprocity measure, they were provided a randomly
generated participant ID number. This ID was required for participation in the following lab
experiment.
Lab Experiment
Z-Tree software was used to conduct the laboratory experiment based on the economic
trust game designed by Berg et al. (1995). In this game, individuals rarely act entirely selfishly
and often act in a reciprocal manner. The game examines two aspects of reciprocity, the
anticipation of a first mover’s expectations of potential reciprocal behavior and the subsequent
action taken by a second mover. This design, therefore, facilitates a test of the reciprocity scale’s
ability to predict and explain individual differences in reciprocal behaviors.
Participants responded to understanding checks to ensure they are aware of rules guiding
the experiment throughout the instructions. Participants were instructed that the game was a oneround economic exchange and their decisions directly affected another’s earnings within the
room to emphasize the impact of their decision. At the beginning of the experiment, participants
were assigned one of two roles: Employee or manager,27 participants in each role are paired
randomly and anonymously with a participant in the other role. The Berg et al. (1995) economic

27

Originally in this experimental design by Berg et al. (1995), individuals were denoted simply by whether they
were in room A (first decision maker) or room B (second decision maker), other previous research has referred to
participants as either player 1 and player 2. For the purpose of this study we contextualize the participants as either
employee or manager respectively.

55

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

trust game employs two stages. First, the manager receives an initial endowment of $10 and
decides whether to transfer an amount (X1) to their manager. The amount transferred from the
employee to the manager is tripled (3X1). Therefore, if the employee transfers $3 of their
endowment, the manager will receive 3 x $3 = $9. In stage two, the manager receives
information about how much of the initial endowment from their employee transferred and the
tripled amount based on this transfer. The manager then decides whether to send an amount back
to their employee (X2). Once the manager makes their decision, both participants receive
information about all decisions and their earnings from their decisions. In addition to their
earnings, all participants receive a $5 show-up fee.
Payment calculations:
Employee payout = $5–X1 + X2
Manager payout = $5 + 3X1 - X2
The experiment was as a one-shot interaction. After answering post-experimental questions, each
participant was paid in cash. Appendix 4 presents screenshots of the experiment implemented in
the lab setting.
Tests of the Reciprocity Measure
I examined 14-item, two-factor sensitivity to reciprocity model to see if it was useful in
predicting and explaining decisions made by the laboratory experiment participants. Participants
completed this 14-item measure remotely via Qualtrics before the laboratory session and as part
of the exit questionnaire at the conclusion of the laboratory session. After aggregating scores
from both the pre-experiment survey, and post-experiment survey, I calculated a scaled score for
all participants measuring from 1 representing low sensitivity to reciprocity, to 5 representing
high sensitivity to reciprocity. Both a continuous measure and a 50/50 median split were used in
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subsequent analyses to designate participants as either having high or low sensitivities to
reciprocity.
Those in the employee role with high sensitivities to reciprocity are expected to anticipate
the reciprocal response of their manager. In turn, employees who anticipate reciprocal actions are
likely to transfer higher levels of their endowment with the expectation that this will increase the
entire pool of wealth, and that manager will reciprocate with a return transfer. Conversely.
Employees who do not anticipate reciprocal actions are less likely to expect their manager to
respond in kind to any transfer on their part. This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1a: Employees with higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity will be more likely to
anticipate reciprocal actions when forming their decision to transfer a portion of their
endowment to their managers, as compared to employees who are less sensitive to
reciprocity.
H1b: Employees with higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity will be more likely to
transfer a higher level of their initial endowment to managers than those who are less
sensitive.
Expected transfers from managers vary in their demonstrated reciprocity in response to
the transfers received from their employees according to their measured sensitivity to reciprocity.
I expect a positive relation between the return transfers from managers and the amount
transferred from their employees. Furthermore, I expect managers who are more sensitive to
reciprocity will return a higher (lower) ratio in response to higher (lower) employee transfers
than managers who are less sensitive to reciprocity. This leads to the following hypotheses,
which are summarized in Figure 7:
H2a: Managers who receive a higher level of transfer from their employees will return a
higher ratio of wealth than those who receive lower levels of transfer.
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H2b: Managers who have higher measures of sensitivity to reciprocity and receive a
larger portion of their employee’s endowment will transfer a higher ratio than all other
exchange scenarios.
H2c: Managers who have high measures of sensitivity to reciprocity and receive a low
portion of their employee’s endowment will transfer a lower ratio than all other exchange
scenarios.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
Independent Variables
Once all survey data was collected, all participants were given an aggregate measure of
their overall sensitivity to reciprocity on a 1 to 5 point scale ranging from 1 indicating low
sensitivity to 5 indicating highly sensitive. For H1a and H1b this continuous measure from 1-5
was utilized for all participants who were designated as employees. For H2a, H2b, and H2c all
participants that were designated as managers were grouped into two categories dependent on
their scores from the sensitivity survey. Participants were assessed to belong to one of two
‘sensitivity to reciprocity’ levels based on a 50/50 median split, and were titled as “highly
sensitive” or “less sensitive”.
The second independent variable measures the amount of endowment employees
transferred to their managers (X1). The employee’s decision of how much of their endowment
sent to the manager ($0.00 - $10.00) was used to create a 50/50 median split between employees
whom were then deemed to either have sent a “high” or “low” amount of their endowment. This
independent variable was utilized for the analysis of H2a.
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable was provided by employee’s response to questions about
their anticipation of their manager’s response, and how this anticipated response influenced their
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transfer decision. The responses to these questions were based on a continuous 1 to 5 scale used
to test H1a. Specifically, employees and managers responded to the two following questions:
1.) How important was your manager’s return transfer in making your transfer decision?
Not at all Important
Very Unimportant
Neither Important nor Unimportant
Very Important
Extremely Important
I was not assigned to be an employee
2.) How important was your employee's transfer in making your transfer decision?
Not at all Important
Very Unimportant
Neither Important nor Unimportant
Very Important
Extremely Important
I was not assigned to be an employee
The second dependent variable measured the amount of endowment employees
transferred to their managers (X1). The employee’s decision of how much of their endowment
sent to the manager ($0.00 - $10.00). This continuous variable was used to test H1b.
The third dependent variable was the amount of wealth managers transfer back to their
employees, measured as a ratio of the amount transferred to them (X2/X1). This continuous
variable was used to test H2a, H2b, and H2c.
Understanding Checks, Manipulation Checks, Post-Experimental Questionnaire
To determine whether participants understood key elements, they answered
understanding checks throughout the experiment’s instructions. Specifically, participants were
tested to make certain they understood their role as either an employee or manager and how their
decisions would affect the final payout. Any misunderstandings about these features of the
experiment were corrected before participants were allowed to continue to the decision round. At
the conclusion of the experiment participants completed a post-experimental questionnaire which
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included additional questions designed to determine the importance of various considerations in
their decision process. Participants also answered basic demographic questions.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
One hundred six students were recruited through the Virginia Commonwealth
University’s Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. Five participants’ were
removed due to either a lack of ability to provide the ID information given to them in the
preliminary survey or because they did not include an email to connect their output data. Fiftyone percent of the remaining 101 students were female. All participants were asked multiple
understanding check questions throughout the experiment with increasing difficulty. Participants
were not able to move forward until they demonstrated that they understood the experimental
procedures for the economic exchange decision they were to make and how those decisions
affected themselves and the participant they would randomly be paired with within the room.
After the participants demonstrated their understanding of the experiment, it was reiterated that
this exchange would be one round of decisions and that their decisions had a direct effect on
another participant within the room.
Table 9 presents the means and medians of the amounts sent by the employee and
returned by their manager in terms of percentage of their overall available wealth. The average
percentage of endowment available sent for those in the employee role was 55 percent (standard
deviation = 0.277), whereas the average percentage returned by the manager was 25 percent
(standard deviation = 0.207). These results indicate that employees, on average, were likely to
share a little more than half of their initial endowment with their managers. Managers returned
a quarter of what they received, which is likely due to the fact that they understood that the
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employee in most cases already retained a portion of the wealth they were initially endowed
with. Therefore, sending half of what managers had received was unnecessary to be equitable.
Table 10 shows that the average profit for each participant was $10.66.
[Insert Table 9 Here]
[Insert Table 10 Here]
Table 11 presents the aggregate scores of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity from
utilizing their responses to the 14-item, 2-factor reciprocity measure. This measure was
distributed in survey form both prior to and after the lab experiment took place. The aggregate
score remained on a 1-5 scale measured from one indicating low sensitivity to reciprocity to five
indicating highly sensitivity to reciprocity. The average score for the entire participant group was
2.91 (standard deviation = 0.365). Participants in the employee role had an average of 2.92
(standard deviation = 0.339), and participants in the manager role had an average of 2.92
(standard deviation = 0.393).
[Insert Table 11 Here]
Employees’ Sensitivity to Reciprocity and Consideration of Amount Sent
Table 12 presents the results of the correlation between an employee’s sensitivity to
reciprocity and their consideration of their managers subsequent action in regards to their
decision to send a portion of their initial endowment.28 The results show that there is not a
significant correlation between the two variables (r = 0.073, n 51, p = 0.613). Mean difference ttest results (presented in Table 13) indicate that there was no significant difference between the

Both the reciprocity measure and the employee’s consideration of their manager was based on a 1-5 Likert scale, 1
being very low, and 5 being very high.
28
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mean consideration based on a 50/50 mean split of sensitivity to reciprocity (4.11, sd = 1.03) and
(4.20, sd = 1.22) respectively. These results do not support Hypothesis H1a.
[Insert Table 12 Here]
[Insert Table 13 Here]
Table 14 presents the results of the correlation between employees’ sensitivity to
reciprocity and the percentage of their initial endowment that they chose to transfer to their
managers. The results show that there is not a significant correlation between the two variables (r
= 0.083, n = 51, p = 0.565). Mean difference t-test results (see Table 15) indicate that there was
no significant difference between the mean transfers based on a 50/50 mean split to designate
employees as possessing either high or low sensitivity to reciprocity (0.55, sd = 0.24) and (0.55,
sd = 0.31), respectively. These results do not support Hypothesis H1b.
[Insert Table 14 Here]
[Insert Table 15 Here]
Table 16 presents the results of the correlation between the effect of the proportion of an
employee’s initial endowment transferred on the manager’s decision to return a portion of their
wealth received. The results show that there is a significant correlation between the two variables
(r = 0.724, n 51, p < 0.001). This result supports Hypothesis H2a.
[Insert Table 16 Here]
Table 17 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest for hypotheses
H2c, H2b, H2c. Across all participants chosen to act as the manager, the average percent of
wealth returned to the employee was 26.13 percent (standard deviation = 0.2063). When
compared to the overall average of the amount sent by those in the employee role, it seems that
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individuals tend to keep a portion that restores some sense of equilibrium, but they allow
themselves to still come out marginally ahead.29
[Insert Table 17 Here]
Table 18 presents the test of the effect of a managers’ level of Sensitivity to Reciprocity
and employees’ Percentage of Endowment Transferred on the Percentage Returned by their
manager.30 The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent significantly affects
the percentage that managers return (F = 34.190, p < 0.001). The main effect of Manager
Reciprocity is marginally significant (F = 3.243, p = 0.078). However, the interaction between
Employee % and Manager Reciprocity (F = 0.428, p = 0.516) is not significant. Figure 8
illustrates the patterns underlying the observed effects.
[Insert Table 18 Here]
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
Supplementary Analysis of Trust and Distributional Fairness
Table 19 presents the correlations for the final 14-item scale, and indicates that 12 items
have significant correlations with the overlapping measure of reciprocity. Using these
correlations, additional analyses were conducted to examine if one or both of the two individual
traits composing the two-factor reciprocity measure (trust sensitivity and distributional fairness
sensitivity) had stronger predictive ability for the dependent variables in the study.
[Insert Table 19 Here]

29

If an employee sends 50% to the manager and the manger returns 25% the final wealth received by both the
employee and manager are $8.75 and $11.25 respectively.
30
High and Low transfer classifications decisions use a median split where all transfers made by the employee that
were <= 50% are classified as low and >%50 are categorized as high. Likewise, High and Low sensitivity measures
are also classified using a median split where all scores < 3.078 are classified as having low sensitivity to reciprocity
and all scores >= 3.078 are classified as having high sensitivity to reciprocity
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Table 20 and Table 21 parse out the measure of an employee’s sensitivity specifically
towards trust and distributional fairness and their likelihood to consider reciprocal behavior of
their paired manager. Table 20 shows the correlations found between the participants designated
as employee’s sensitivity to trust and their subsequent consideration of their paired manager’s
decision dependent on how much they initially transferred, from this it does not indicate that this
measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two variables (r = 0.201, n =
51, p = 0.158). Similarly, Table 21 shows the correlations found between the participants
designated as employee’s sensitivity to distributional fairness and their subsequent consideration
of their paired manager’s decision dependent on how much they initially transferred, from this it
does not indicate that this measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two
variables (r = -0.208, n = 51, p = 0.143).
[Insert Table 20 Here]
[Insert Table 21 Here]
Table 22 and 23 parses out the measure of an employee’s sensitivity specifically towards
trust and distributional fairness and their initial endowment transfer to their paired manager.
Table 22 shows the correlations found between the employees’ sensitivity to trust and their
subsequent endowment sent, from this it does not indicate that this measure was predictive of
behavior with correlation between the two variables (r = -0.013, n = 51, p = 0.926). Similarly,
Table 23 shows the correlations found between the participants designated as employee’s
sensitivity to distributional fairness and their subsequent endowment sent, from this it does not
indicate that this measure was predictive of behavior with correlation between the two variables
(r = 0.155, n = 51, p = 0.276).
[Insert Table 22 Here]
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[Insert Table 23 Here]
Table 24 parses out the measure of a manager’s sensitivity specifically towards trust, the
employee’s initial endowment sent, and the manager’s subsequent return transfer to their paired
employee. The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent significantly affects
the percentage that managers return (F = 35.430, p < 0.001). The main effect of Distributional
Fairness Sensitivity is marginally significant (F = 0.048, p = 0.827). However, the interaction
between Employee % and Distributional Fairness Sensitivity (F = 0.389 p = 0.536) is not
significant.
[Insert Table 24 Here]
Table 25 shows the measure of a manager’s sensitivity specifically towards distributional
fairness, the employee’s initial endowment sent, and the manager’s subsequent return transfer to
their paired employee. The analysis indicates that the main effect of Employee % Sent
significantly affects the percentage that managers return (F = 35.585, p < 0.001). The main effect
of Distributional Fairness Sensitivity is marginally significant (F = 0.138, p = 0.712). However,
the interaction between Employee % and Distributional Fairness Sensitivity (F = 0.003, p =
0.956) is not significant.
[Insert Table 25 Here]
DISCUSSION
This dissertation attempted to reach further into the theory of reciprocity and the multiple
dimensions that have formed it through previous research. However, the iterative process of
scale development resulted in a 14-item, 2-factor model whose fit indices did not meet desired
levels of goodness of fit. Further, this model did not exhibit predictive ability in an economic
setting. However, this process opens a discussion as to what characteristics interact with
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reciprocity and lays groundwork for future research in this field. The results suggest that the
direct actions of another person appeared to have a significant impact on behavior, as is
suggested by the significant correlation between managers’ responses to employees’ initial
transfer.
There was, however, some difference observed when a negative state was induced in the
scenario. This occurred when employees sent a small portion of their endowment and managers
who were more sensitive to reciprocity exhibited stronger negative reciprocity than managers
who were less sensitive to reciprocity. Additional research is needed to examine the potential for
individuals who are sensitive to reciprocity to be more demonstrative in negative interactions
than in positive interactions. Further research is also needed to build upon the initial groundwork
laid in this study in the effort to create a measure of individual sensitivity to reciprocity.
Alternative explanations for the results not adhering to expectations include the number
of participants surveyed when conducting the EFA. While previous researchers, such as Fabrigar
et al. (1999), suggest four observations per item, others (such as Comrey and Lee 1992) suggest
that much larger numbers are needed. Osborne (1997), for example, utilized 1,908 participants
for a 13-item questionnaire. This indicates that numbers play a role in scale development and the
power of the results. It may be of interest to deploy the survey on a much larger scale or with
other populations of respondents.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Attribution
A clear area for additional research is to explore other dimensions to create a more
comprehensive measure of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity. For example, examining the
attribution dimension may add depth in replicating current and prior studies. Freud (1894)
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describes an individuals’ ego and its ability to reject “unbearable ideas.” This may negatively
affect one’s image of self. Simply stated, individuals may lack the ability to objectively assess
traits or events that cause them to feel as though they have faults. Langer (1975) introduced the
theory of the “illusion of control,” in which individuals attribute success to their own
action/abilities, even in a scenario in which their success is determined entirely by chance. The
dimension of attribution predicts that individuals are more likely to attribute successful outcomes
to their own contributions or ability. Conversely, they attribute unsuccessful outcomes to outside
sources beyond their control (Langer 1975; Ross and Sicoly 1979; Bartling and Fishbacher
2011).
Attribution is individuals’ perception of their contribution to an outcome. This dimension
may be inherent in understanding reciprocity. If individuals attribute outcomes solely to their
own performance, then they have no reason to react to other individuals’ actions. While pure
objectivity (Floyd and Sputtek 2011; Ragin 2000, 2014) does not lend theory to individuals’
perception that they are entirely in control of every outcome (Langer 1975), it lends to a specific
side of the spectrum of attribution. Specifically, if individuals have higher levels of objectivity,
they are better able to correctly allocate their own contribution toward an outcome whether it be
success or failure. In opposition, individuals who attribute outcome entirely to other sources
would likely demonstrate a dysfunctional reciprocated behavior. They would incorrectly allocate
the responsibility for success or failure either entirely to their own contribution or other
influences.
Prior accounting literature on attribution theory often focuses on individuals’ “egocentric
bias” in defining their ability to affect the success or failure of an outcome, regardless of their
actual contribution or ability to do so (Sicoly and Ross 1977; Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson
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and Kelley 1981). Early psychological works, noted that individuals are so averse to attributing
failure to themselves that they will incorrectly recollect any outcome their ego may deem as
“unbearable ideas that damage a psychological image of one’s self.” When outcomes are
positive, individuals are prone to elicit an “illusion of control” in which they attribute success to
their own talents, even under conditions in which the outcome is determined by pure chance.
This extends to situations in which a person attributes their efforts and talent to the success of a
group (Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelly 1981; Rather and Herskowitz 1977).
The primary stream of behavioral accounting literature related to the effects of attribution
and reciprocity is in contract negotiations. For example, an organization is looking to hire an
employee and falsely offers the potential hire the possibility to control the outcome of their
wage. The potential new hire will likely feel slighted due to the ruse. Given the feeling of lack of
actual control of their outcome, the new hire provides lower levels of effort. Conversely, when
giving subordinates actual decision power in a contract engagement, the new hires provide
higher levels of effort. Choi (2014) demonstrated attribution of bonus offers dependent on labor
market scarcity. New hires offered a bonus contract in a scarce labor market would attribute the
bonus to their own importance. Conversely, new hires offered a bonus contract in a surplus labor
market would attribute the bonus to a sign of goodwill, resulting in increased effort.
Predicted Responses for Varying Sensitivities to Attribution
Individuals with a negative predisposition toward attribution would not objectively
attribute a positive outcome in situations in which their own ability had limited impact (Langer
1975). The individual would also not accept responsibility when faced with a negative outcome
(Ross and Sicoly 1979; Thompson and Kelley 1981). If individuals have a positive
predisposition toward attribution, they are likely to attribute a positive outcome in situations in
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which their ability affected the outcome. They would have the objective ability to assess their
contributions to success or failure. If, for example, individuals have a positive predisposition,
they will likely respond to positive or negative feedback with similar assessments of themselves.
They can properly attribute their actions to an outcome. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship
between an individual’s level of sensitivity to attribution and expected response to success and
failure.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
Duration
One possible extension for the final scale would include the duration of a relationship and
how it affects reciprocal tendencies. Due to the sheer size of the original item pool, duration was
not included in the scale development for this dissertation. Previous works have shown
differences in reciprocal behavior based on the length of an expected relationship between
parties. Prior studies, especially those examining relationships between auditors, analysts, and
management, illustrate effects due to the duration of the relationship – sometimes in the opposite
of the predicted direction (Fisher et al. 2015). Problems arise in interpreting these results;
however, as potential confounding effects (most notably, industry experience) may minimize the
impact of an individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity. These issues would be critical to explore
before developing an appropriate set of items related to the effects of relationship duration on
reciprocal tendencies.
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APPENDIX 1
Initial MTurk Instrument – V 1.0
VCU IRB PROTOCOL NUMBER: HM20013040

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

STUDY TITLE: Reciprocity in the Workplace: A Survey
VCU INVESTIGATORS: Alisa Brink, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Accounting
Kelly Green, Accounting Doctoral Candidate

You are invited to participate in a research study examining reciprocity (how people respond to other
people’s behaviors). You are being asked to participate in this study because of your current status as an
Amazon Mechanical Turk worker. Your participation is voluntary.
This survey will be conducted in one session that will last 10-15 minutes.
·
You will accept to engage in the Amazon Mechanical Turk ‘HIT’.
·
You will be provided a link to a survey that will allow you to engage in the survey on Qualtrics.
·
·

You will engage in the brief survey in Qualtrics.
You will receive a code provided by Qualtrics to confirm that the survey has been completed.

·
·

Once confirmed you will receive compensation.
Your total payment will be $1.50 paid through your amazon account.

Workers are being hired to provide complete and thoughtful responses, researches are providing cause for
rejecting submissions that are either incomplete or show evidence of inattentive completion.

In the future, any information identifying you will be removed from the information you provide in this
study. After that removal, the information could be used for other research studies by this study team
or another researcher without asking you for additional consent.
Please enter your MTurk Worker ID # to continue.
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Survey Questions
If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person to get it.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○
Strongly agree
If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker".
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
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○
○
○

Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Keeping excess funds is okay so long as if would go unnoticed by my manager.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Use of deception is fine so long as it provides a completive advantage.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interaction with.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to trust individuals whom I have had extended periods of interaction with.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to be more honest with managers who I have had extended periods of interaction with,
regardless of positive or negative interaction.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
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I am more likely to show leniency to employees whom I expect repeated interactions with.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair and knew I would not be caught.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and knew I would not be caught.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager has shared with me a portion of the profits.
○ ○Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
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○
○
○

Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
It doesn't take much to make me angry.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree

87

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

Most people tend to angry more quickly than I do.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly outlined by my
manager.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I believe that direction outlined by my manager is intended to improve the overall success of the
organization and employees alike.
○ Strongly disagree
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○
○
○
○

Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree

I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances in which directions are explicitly outlined by my
manager.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to reward a coworker if I feel that they are exerting their full effort on a task.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I am likely to punish a coworker if I feel that they are not exerting their full effort on a task.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into consideration potential negative feedback from
subordinates when imposing controls.
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
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○
○

Agree
Strongly agree

Attention Check Questions
Please select the answer "Neither agree nor disagree"
○ Strongly disagree
○ Disagree
○ Neither agree nor disagree
○ Agree
○ Strongly agree
Please select the answer Green
○ Red
○ Blue
○ Yellow
○ Green
○ Purple

English Proficiency Check Questions
Please complete this sentence
"I haven't got…"
○ no brothers or sisters.
○ brothers or sisters.
○ any brothers or sisters.
○ some brothers and sisters.
Please select the correct phrase
○ Always he arrives at 2:30
○ He arrives at always 2:30
○ He always arrives at 2:30
○ He always at 2:30 arrives

Demographic Questions
What is your age?
○ 18-24 years old
○ 25-34 years old
○ 35-44 years old
○
45-54 years old
○ 55-64 years old
○ 65-74 years old
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○

75 years or older

How many years of full-time work experience do you have?
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree
received.
○ No schooling completed
○ Elementary school to 8th grade
○ Some high school, no diploma
○ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
○ Some college credit, no degree
○ Trade/technical/vocational training
○ Associate degree
○ Bachelor's degree
○ Master's degree
○ Professional degree
What is your gender?
○ Male
○ Female
○ Prefer not to respond
Is English your first language?
○ Yes
○ No
Completion Page
Thank you for participating,
Here is your ID : #######
Copy this value to paste into MTurk
When you have copied this ID, please click the next button to submit your survey.
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APPENDIX 2
IRB Approval Letter – Scale Development
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APPENDIX 3
IRB Approval Letter – Experiment
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APPENDIX 4
Screenshots of the Laboratory Experiment
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FIGURE 1: Predicted Relations between Dimensions of Reciprocity

Trust

Distributional
Fairness

Intention

Reciprocity

Utilized for
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Negotiation
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FIGURE 2: Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness
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Level of Honesty/Trust Reciprocated

FIGURE 3: Sensitivity to HonestyTrust
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FIGURE 4: Sensitivity to Intention
Level of Destructive Behavior
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Objectiveness of Performance/Ability

FIGURE 5: Sensitivity to Attribution
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FIGURE 6: Churchill Methodology for Scale Development
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FIGURE 7: Predictions for H2
Endowment sent by employee
High

Low

Manager
with high
sensitivity

Highest return

Lowest return

Manager
with low
sensitivity

Moderate return

Moderate return
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FIGURE 8: Average % Returned by Managers
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CITATION

JOURNAL

RESEARCH
METHOD

TABLE 1.1
RECIPROCITY
INDEPENDENT
SAMPLE
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Fisher et al.
(2015) (1)

Fisher et al.
(2015) (2)

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

1 by 3
Between
Subject

60
Interaction Conditions
Undergraduate
Effort
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single)
Students

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

1 by 3
Between
Subject

32
Undergraduate Interaction Conditions
Effort
Business
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single)
Students

Empirical

Price earnings
forecasts from
UK-Listed
firms.
(I/B/E/S
database)

Ho et al.
Accounting
and Business
Research
Brochet et al.
(2014)
The
Accounting
Review

Survey

829
CEO/CFO
Turnover
Observations

Price revisions, Stock
Returns, Earnings forecasts
revisions, Recommendations,
Revisions

CEO/CFO Turnover

116

KEY RESULTS
In a repeated-interaction setting
where reciprocal behavior can
emerge for strategic reasons, we
find that superiors set lower targets
and that employees generally
respond to low targets with high
effort and to high targets with low
effort
In a "cheap-talk" economic
scenario an individual’s preference
for reciprocity does not play a
stronger role in a single-interaction
target-setting scenario when
supervisors assign lower targets
with greater frequency.

Target Price
Revisions

Revisions are significantly more
sensitive to negative than positive
excess stock returns.

Analyst
Migration

CEO Turnover is associated with
analyst migration. While this
shows no significant comparative
advantage for coverage for
analysts migrating, it does show
increased access to communication
with managers.
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Coletti et al.
(2005) (1)

Coletti et al.
(2005) (2)

The
Accounting
Review

Two-way
Between
Subject

82
Control System (present or
Undergraduate
absent)
Students

Cooperative
Activity

The
Accounting
Review

Two-way
Between
Subject

62
Undergraduate
Control System
and Graduate
Students

Cooperative
Activity

Ke and Yong
Journal of
Accounting
Research

Matsumoto
(2012)

The
Accounting
Review

Mayew (2008)
Journal of
Accounting
Research

228,904 firmanalyst-year
Regression of
observations
Annual
over the
Earnings
period January
Forecasts
1, 1983 to
June 30, 2000
29,460 firmquarters from
Archival
nonregulated
industries
27,642
quarterly
earnings
conference
Archival
call transcripts
between Jan
2002- Dec
2004

Control systems can induce
cooperative behavior between
employees, which builds a trusting
relationship for continued positive
collaborative behavior.
Upon removing a control system
employees are more likely to
collaborate in subsequent rounds in
those groups which have
previously established trust.

Analyst Bias

Earnings
Forecast
Accuracy

Industry, Size, Growth, R%D
expenses,

Meet or Exceed
analyst
forecast guidance
expectation

Decision to buy or sell.

Participative
(analyst
questions)

117

Analysts cater to management to
keep job longevity.

Downgrades are associated with
managers giving less private
information
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Youngtae et al.
(2012)
The
Accounting
Review

Archival

28,741 firm
year
observations
from 1991 to
2009

Corporate Social
Responsibility activity

118

Earnings
management,
real operating
activity
management,
SEC
Investigation

Firms that engage in CSR are less
likely to Manage earnings,
manipulate real operating activities
and be subject of SEC
investigations.
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CITATION
Douthit and
Stevens (2014)
(1)

JOURNAL

TABLE 1.2
LITERATURE REVIEW - TRUST/HONESTY
RESEARCH
INDEPENDENT
DEPENDENT
SAMPLE
METHOD
VARIABLES
VARIABLES

The
Accounting
Review

Two by Two
Between
Subject

120 College
Students

Superior Pay and
Factual Assertion

The
Accounting
Review

2 by 1
Between
Subject

64 M.B.A.
Students

Profit Shock (Positive or Effort/ Firm
Negative
profit

The
Accounting
Review

1x2
Betweensubject

80 MBA.
Students

Contract Setting (Gift
Exchange or Optimal
available)

Effort/Firm
profit

The
Accounting
Review

1x2
Betweensubject

40 MBA.
Students

Contract Setting (Gift
Exchange and Optimal
available)

Effort/Firm
profit

Budgetary
Slack

Hannan (2005)

Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(1)

Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(2)

119

KEY RESULTS
Honesty plays a strong role in
effecting budgetary slack. In
experiment one it is shown to have a
significant strength when
distributional fairness is not salient
when withholding relative superior
pay information from a subordinate.
Firms that provide their employees
with higher wages receive higher
levels of effort. However, employees
have asymmetric views on firm loss in
that feel that they are entitled to share
profits but not losses.
Although optimal contracts yield
higher overall profit than gift
exchange contracts, it is shown that
employees may react negatively by
punishing the firm even at their own
costs due to the nonreciprocal aspects
of the contracts.
When both gift exchange and optimal
contracts are available employees are
more likely to reject the optimal
contracts. This leads to lower firm
profit. Further there is some support
showing that firms will begin to offer
gift exchange contracts more often as
experience is gained.
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Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(3)

The
Accounting
Review

1x3
Betweensubject

40 MBA.
Students

Contract Setting (Gift
Exchange, Optimal and
Hybrid available)

Effort/Firm
profit

Contemporary
Accounting
Research

2x2
Betweensubject

80 MBA
Students

Contract Type (outputbased or fixed) and
Negotiation (present or
not)

Effort/Firm
profit

Kuang and
Moser (2011)

When all three contract settings are
available (Gift Exchange, Optimal and
Hybrid) a market scenario takes place
in which hybrid contracts become
offer the best balance of welfare for
the employees and firm profits.
Firms are less likely to allow
negotiation under output-based
contract scenarios.
They are also more likely to accept
counter-offers under fixed wage
scenarios.
Further, employees show higher
efforts for those firms that match their
wage counter-offers (engage in
negotiation)
Overall output-based contracts are less
optimal than fixed.

Bohner et al.
(2001)

Maxwell et al.
(2003)

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

Journal of
Business
Research

Cross131 Laboratory
Classification
Studies
Analysis

2x2
Betweensubject

Task Type, Incentive
Scheme, Task
Complexity

70
Fairness Primer and
Undergraduates Reciprocity

120

Performance

Organizations must consider both
financial and nonfinancial attributes of
incentive schemes as financial
initiatives do not always properly
motivate individuals.

Buyer offer
and level of
concession

Individuals who were primed with
fairness condition caused them to
become more cooperative.
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Maas (2012)
The
Accounting
Review

Quasiexperiment

167

Aggregate performance

121

Willingness to
obtain
additional
costly
information
(Effort)

Managers are willing to incur costs to
their own wealth in order to attain
information that allows them to
allocate bonuses to their employees
fairly.
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CITATION

JOURNAL

TABLE 1.3
LITERATURE REVIEW – DISTRIBUTIONAL FAIRNESS
RESEARCH
INDEPENDENT
DEPENDENT
SAMPLE
METHOD
VARIABLES
VARIABLES

Douthit and
Stevens
(2014) (1)
The Accounting
Review

Two by Two
Between
Subject

120 College
Students

The Accounting
Review

2 by 1
Between
Subject

64 M.B.A.
Students

The Accounting
Review

1x2
Betweensubject

80 MBA.
Students

Hannan
(2005)

Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(1)

KEY RESULTS

Honesty plays a strong role
in effecting budgetary slack.
In experiment one it is
shown to have a significant
Superior Pay and
Budgetary Slack strength when distributional
Factual Assertion
fairness is not salient when
withholding relative superior
pay information from a
subordinate.
Firms that provide their
employees with higher
wages receive higher levels
Profit Shock
Effort/ Firm
of effort. However,
(Positive or Negative profit
employees have asymmetric
views on firm loss in that
feel that they are entitled to
share profits but not losses.
Although optimal contracts
yield higher overall profit
than gift exchange contracts,
Contract Setting
it is shown that employees
Effort/Firm
(Gift Exchange or
may react negatively by
profit
Optimal available)
punishing the firm even at
their own costs due to the
nonreciprocal aspects of the
contracts.

122
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Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(2)
The Accounting
Review

1x2
Betweensubject

The Accounting
Review

1x3
Betweensubject

40 MBA.
Students

Contract Setting
(Gift Exchange and
Optimal available)

Effort/Firm
profit

40 MBA.
Students

Contract Setting
(Gift Exchange,
Optimal and Hybrid
available)

Effort/Firm
profit

80 MBA
Students

Contract Type
(output-based or
fixed) and
Negotiation (present
or not)

Effort/Firm
profit

Kuang and
Moser (2009)
(3)

Kuang and
Moser (2011)

Contemporary
Accounting
Research

2x2
Betweensubject

123

When both gift exchange and
optimal contracts are
available employees are
more likely to reject the
optimal contracts. This leads
to lower firm profit. Further
there is some support
showing that firms will begin
to offer gift exchange
contracts more often as
experience is gained.
When all three contract
settings are available (Gift
Exchange, Optimal and
Hybrid) a market scenario
takes place in which hybrid
contracts become offer the
best balance of welfare for
the employees and firm
profits.
Firms are less likely to allow
negotiation under outputbased contract scenarios.
They are also more likely to
accept counter-offers under
fixed wage scenarios.
Further, employees show
higher efforts for those firms
that match their wage
counter-offers (engage in
negotiation)
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Overall output-based
contracts are less optimal
than fixed.
Bohner et al.
(2001)

Maxwell et
al. (2003)

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

Journal of
Business
Research

CrossClassification
Analysis

131 Laboratory
Studies

Task Type, Incentive
Scheme, Task
Performance
Complexity

2x2
Betweensubject

70
Undergraduates

Fairness Primer and
Reciprocity

Buyer offer and
level of
concession

Aggregate
performance

Willingness to
obtain
additional
costly
information
(Effort)

Maas (2012)
The Accounting
Review

Quasiexperiment

167

124

Organizations must consider
both financial and
nonfinancial attributes of
incentive schemes as
financial initiatives do not
always properly motivate
individuals.
Individuals who were primed
with fairness condition
caused them to become more
cooperative.
Managers are willing to
incur costs to their own
wealth in order to attain
information that allows them
to allocate bonuses to their
employees fairly.
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CITATION

JOURNAL

RESEARCH
METHOD

TABLE 1.4
LITERATURE REVIEW - INTENTION
INDEPENDENT
SAMPLE
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Fisher et al.
(2015) (1)

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

1 by 3
Between
Subject

60
Undergraduate
Students

Interaction Conditions
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single)

Effort

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

1 by 3
Between
Subject

32
Undergraduate
Business
Students

Interaction Conditions
(Repeated/Reassigned/Single)

Effort

Fisher et al.
(2015) (2)

125

KEY RESULTS
In a repeatedinteraction setting
where reciprocal
behavior can emerge
for strategic reasons,
we find that
superiors set lower
targets and that
employees generally
respond to low
targets with high
effort and to high
targets with low
effort
In a "cheap-talk"
economic scenario
an individual’s
preference for
reciprocity does not
play a stronger role
in a singleinteraction targetsetting scenario
when supervisors
assign lower targets
with greater
frequency.
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Ho et al.
Empirical

Price earnings
forecasts from
UK-Listed
firms. (I/B/E/S
database)

Price revisions, Stock Returns,
Earnings forecasts revisions,
Recommendations, Revisions

Target Price
Revisions

The
Accounting
Review

Survey

829 CEO/CFO
Turnover
Observations

CEO/CFO Turnover

Analyst
Migration

The
Accounting
Review

Two-way
Between
Subject

82
Undergraduate
Students

Control System (present or
absent)

Cooperative
Activity

The
Accounting
Review

Two-way
Between
Subject

62
Undergraduate
and Graduate
Students

Control System

Cooperative
Activity

Accounting
and Business
Research
Brochet et
al. (2014)

Coletti et al.
(2005) (1)

Coletti et al.
(2005) (2)

126

Revisions are
significantly more
sensitive to negative
than positive excess
stock returns.
CEO Turnover is
associated with
analyst migration.
While this shows no
significant
comparative
advantage for
coverage for analysts
migrating, it does
show increased
access to
communication with
managers.
Control systems can
induce cooperative
behavior between
employees, which
builds a trusting
relationship for
continued positive
collaborative
behavior.
Upon removing a
control system
employees are more
likely to collaborate
in subsequent rounds
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in those groups
which have
previously
established trust.
Ke and
Yong

Matsumoto
(2012)

Mayew
(2008)

Journal of
Accounting
Research

The
Accounting
Review

Journal of
Accounting
Research

228,904 firmanalyst-year
observations
over the period
January 1, 1983
to June 30, 2000

Analyst Bias

Earnings
Forecast
Accuracy

Analysts cater to
management to keep
job longevity.

Archival

29,460 firmquarters from
nonregulated
industries

Industry, Size, Growth, R%D
expenses,

Meet or Exceed
analyst
expectation

forecast guidance

Archival

27,642 quarterly
earnings
conference call
transcripts
between Jan
2002- Dec 2004

Decision to buy or sell.

Participative
(analyst
questions)

Downgrades are
associated with
managers giving less
private information

Earnings
management,
real operating
activity
management,
SEC
Investigation

Firms that engage in
CSR are less likely
to Manage earnings,
manipulate real
operating activities
and be subject of
SEC investigations.

Regression of
Annual
Earnings
Forecasts

Youngtae et
al. (2012)
The
Accounting
Review

Archival

28,741 firm year
observations
Corporate Social
from 1991 to
Responsibility activity
2009

127
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CITATION

JOURNAL

TABLE 1.5
LITERATURE REVIEW - ATTRIBUTION
RESEARCH
INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT
SAMPLE
METHOD
VARIABLES
VARIABLES

Douthit and
Stevens
(2014) (2)
The
Accounting
Review

Two by Two
Between
Subject

120 College
Students

Salary Authority
and Factual
Assertion

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

3 by 2 by 2
Experimental

108 Graduate
Accounting
Students

Source of Control,
Control Existence,
Feedback

Effort

Journal of
Management
Accounting
Research

3 by 2 by 2
Experimental

106 Graduate
Accounting
Students

Source of Control,
Control Existence,
Feedback

Effort

The
Accounting
Review

2 by 2 Fully
Crossed

201
Undergraduate
Students

Labor Market &
Signing Bonus
Option

Effort

Budgetary
Slack

Christ
(2013) (1)

Christ
(2013) (2)

Choi (2014)

128

KEY RESULTS
In experiment two, honesty
is shown to have a
significant effect on
budgetary slack when
reciprocity is made salient
in the form of a superiors'
ability to reject a
subordinates' budgetary
proposal.
Source of control affects
reciprocity in the form of
an employee’s effort levels.
Higher saliency of the
source of control is met
with more intense reactions
from employees whom the
control is imposed.
Managers who entrust their
employees with more
resources are met with
positive reciprocity in the
form of employees
returning more points
(measured as effort)
Employees offered a
signing bonus in the
presence of an excess
workforce environment
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perceive higher trust and
thereby increase effort.

Christ, et al.
(2012)
The
Accounting
Review

2 by 2 plus 1
Betweensubjects

220 Graduate
and
Undergraduate
Students

Contract Frame &
Contract
Implementation

2 by 2
Betweensubjects

323 U.S.
Participants
From Amazon's
Mechanical
Turk

Management
Orientation
Effort to Help
(trust/control) &
or Harm
Manager's Incentive Manager
Frame

Christ and
Vance
(2018)
Accounting,
Organizations
and Society

Schatzberg
and Stevens
(2008)
Journal of
Accounting
Research

Two-treatment
split-plot
96 MBA
factorial
Students
design

Rejection Power,
Pair Rotation, and
Experience level of
producer

129

Effort

Budgetary
Slack & Effort

Trust is reciprocal,
specifically it is found that
penalty contract structures
engender greater distrust
between principals and
agents than do bonus
contracts.
In addition to showing that
penalty contracts can elicit
lower levels of effort from
employees, penalty
contracts coupled with a
poor manager/employee
relationship can cause
employees to actively harm
their managers, even at
their own detriment.
Manager power to reject
budgetary requests reduces
budgetary slack by 50%,
and also establishes an
expectation of reciprocity
in which allowing more
budgetary slack in turn
increases effort of
employees.
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TABLE 1.6
NEGOTIATION
CITATION
Hatfield,
Agolglia and
Sanchez
(2008) (1)

Hatfield,
Agolglia and
Sanchez
(2008) (2)

JOURNAL

SAMPLE

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

DEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Decision to waive
or post adjustment,
determining
reciprocity-based
strategy.

Negotiation goals,
limits, and
counteroffers

Journal of
Accounting
Research

2 by 2
Betweensubjects

60 Audit
Managers
and Partners

Client
Negotiation
Strategy and
Client Retentions

Journal of
Accounting
Research

2 by 1
Betweensubjects

44 Audit
Managers

Auditor
Negotiation
Strategy

The
Accounting
Review

2x2 Between
subject Case
Study Delivered by
Cover Letter
and USB
Drive

Hatfield and
Mullis. (2010)

Hatfield and
Mullis. (2015)

RESEARCH
METHOD

Accounting
Matters

Empirical

40 Partners,
60
Managers,
and 2 Senior
auditors
Prior
research in
psychology
and social
psychology

Magnitude of
audit difference,
client concession

n/a

130

KEY RESULTS
In situations in which
management's negotiation strategy
is competitive and client retention
risk is high, auditors are more likely
to utilize a reciprocity-based
strategy.
Use of a reciprocity-based strategy
can result in more conservative
statements, by reducing perceived
client pressures to waive or reduce
proposed adjustments therefore
increasing financial statement
quality.

Negotiation limits

Auditors propose smaller
adjustments when the magnitude of
the audit difference is high and
when the client conceded on an
audit issue prior to resolving the
difference in estimates.

n/a

Designed model illustrating that
audit quality and financial statement
quality is mediated by AuditorClient Management Negotiations
(ACM)
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Sanchez et al.
(2007) (1)

Sanchez et al.
(2007) (2)

The
Accounting
Review

1 x3
Betweensubject

124
Controllers
and CFOs

Concession
approach

The
Accounting
Review

1 x3
Betweensubject

36 Audit
Managers

Concession
approach

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice and
Theory

2 by 2
Betweensubjects

99 Managers
and Partners
from China

Negotiation style
(collaborative vs.
contentious) &
Negotiation
Experience

Experimental
Case

89
Professional
auditors

Auditors
satisfaction with
prior client
engagement.

Survey

132 Public
Audit Firms

Negotiation
Issue/Context/Co
nstraint

Fu et al. (2011)

Kerler and
Killough

Journal of
Business
Ethics

Gibbins et al.
(2001)
Journal of
Accounting
Research
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Client's
Willingness to post
accounting
adjustments. Client
satisfaction &
retention

Clients are more willing to post
sales adjustments when concession
approaches are utilized. Clients
show higher levels of satisfaction
and retention rates when concession
approaches are utilized.
Auditors believe that it is
appropriate to adjust their
Auditor
negotiation tactics in order to
perceptions
increase customer satisfaction and
facilitation of posting significant
adjustments.
Amount of a
Negotiation experience leads to
proposed audit
higher perceived write-downs; this
adjustment relating is consistent whether a collaborative
to an impairment
or a contentious client negotiation
loss believed to
style is employed. Negotiation style
ultimately be
does however have an effect when
recorded.
the auditor is less experienced.
An auditors' satisfaction with their
Auditors trust and client affects trust in the client. i.e.
subsequent
higher levels of satisfaction are
perceived risk.
associated with higher levels of
trust, and vice versa.
Negotiation process affects
financial statements materially, and
this is a normal part of auditing
Outcome Context
practice where two parties must
reach an agreement. Auditor-client
relationship affects potential
changes to financial statements.
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Shaub (1996)

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

Questionnaire

119 Senior
and
Managers
from KPMG

Experience,
Incentive,
Communication

132

Trustworthiness,
Independence

Experience and situational factors
dominate measure of perceived
trustworthiness and auditor
independence.
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TABLE 2
Dimensions of Reciprocity
Dimension of
Reciprocity

Quotes from Previous Literature Defining SubDimension

Previous Behavioral
Experiments Used for
Item Development

Distributional
Fairness

"Fairness equilibrium"

Douthit and Stevens
(2015)

Trust

“Trust is a type of expectation that alleviates the fear
that one's exchange partner will act
opportunistically” -Bradach and Eccles (1989)

Antle and Eppens (1985)

“The cognitive element in trust is characterized by a
cognitive "leap" beyond the expectations that reason
and experience alone would warrant” - Lewis and
Weigert (1985)

Ke and Yu (2006)

"The extent to which negotiations are fair and
commitments are upheld" - Anderson and Narus
(1990)
"An innate personal characteristic reflecting one's
preference for upholding some social norm of
behavior, regardless of economic incentives." Coletti et. al (2005)
Opposite of
Honesty
(Agency Theory)

"The excess of resources allocated over the
minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks
assigned"

133

Evans et al. (2001)

Ho et al. (2018)
Schatzberg and Stevens
(2008)
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Intention

"How the agent perceives the principal’s decision to
control and how this affects the age behavior"

Christ (2013)
Douthit (2017)
Douthit and Stevens
(2015)
Fisher (2015)
Linderbaum and Levy
(2010)
Schatzberg and Stevens
(2008)

134
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TABLE 3
RECIPROCITY SCALE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION
Statements below are ones that participants would potentially use to describe behavior they are either likely or unlikely to engage in. Please circle
responses that would indicate if you agree or disagree with level of agreement you relate to each statement. It is requested that you do not spend too
much on any particular item. Please keep in mind that there are no correct or incorrect answers merely your feelings on each statement. 31

#

Source Citation Primary Construct
1= Disagree Very Strongly, 2 = Disagree Strongly, 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 4 = Agree Strongly, 5 = Agree Very Strongly

1

HEXACO

Trust

-

If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in order to get it.
1
2
3
4
5

2

HEXACO

Trust

-

I don't see anything wrong with using flattery to get ahead in life.
1
2
3
4
5

3

HEXACO

Trust

-

I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.
1
2
3
4
5

4

HEXACO

Trust

+

I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.
1
2
3
4
5

5

HEXACO

Trust

-

If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes.
1
2
3
4
5

6

HEXACO

Trust

+

I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
1
2
3
4
5

7

HEXACO

Trust

+

If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.
1
2
3
4
5

31

Initially this was formatted in a way that could be distributed to accounting students within the Intermediate Accounting courses, but I was unable to fit within the
course scheduling
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8

HEXACO

Trust

-

If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into giving it.
1
2
3
4
5

9

HEXACO

Trust

-

If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
1
2
3
4
5

10

HEXACO

Trust

+

I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker".
1
2
3
4
5

11

HEXACO

Trust

-

I wouldn't feel bad about deceiving people who allow themselves to be deceived.
1
2
3
4
5

12

HEXACO

Trust

-

I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.
1
2
3
4
5

13

HEXACO

Trust

+

I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them.
1
2
3
4
5

14

HEXACO

Trust

+

I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
1
2
3
4
5

15

HEXACO

Trust

-

I would like to know how to smuggle things across the border.
1
2
3
4
5

16

HEXACO

Trust

17

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness +

Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.
1
2
3
4
5

18

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness +

Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
1
2
3
4
5

19

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

I prefer to have high-status, successful people as my friends.
1
2
3
4
5

20

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.
1
2
3
4
5

I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
1
2
3
4
5
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21

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.
1
2
3
4
5

22

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

I would enjoy being a member of a fancy, high-class casino.
1
2
3
4
5

23

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
1
2
3
4
5

24

HEXACO

Distributional Fairness -

If there is some chance of improving my social status, I take big risks.
1
2
3
4
5

25

HEXACO

Attribution

-

I deserve more influence and authority than most other people do.
1
2
3
4
5

26

HEXACO

Attribution

+

I am an ordinary person who is no better than others.
1
2
3
4
5

27

HEXACO

Attribution

+

I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.
1
2
3
4
5

28

HEXACO

Attribution

-

I am special and superior in many ways.
1
2
3
4
5

29

HEXACO

Attribution

-

Sometimes I feel that laws should not apply to someone like me.
1
2
3
4
5

30

HEXACO

Attribution

-

I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
1
2
3
4
5

31

HEXACO

Attribution

-

Some people would say that I have an over-inflated ego.
1
2
3
4
5

32

HEXACO

Attribution

-

I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
1
2
3
4
5

33

HEXACO

Intention

-

It doesn’t take much to make me angry.
1
2
3
4
5
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34

HEXACO

Intention

-

People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.
1
2
3
4
5

35

HEXACO

Intention

+

I rarely feel anger, even when people treat me quite badly.
1
2
3
4
5

36

HEXACO

Intention

+

Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.
1
2
3
4
5

37

HEXACO

Intention

+

Some people say that they have never seen me angry.
1
2
3
4
5

38

HEXACO

Intention

-

I find it hard to keep my temper when people insult me.
1
2
3
4
5

39

HEXACO

Intention

-

I react very angrily if I find that someone is trying to cheat me.
1
2
3
4
5

40

HEXACO

Intention

+

People can approach me without having to worry about the mood I’m in.
1
2
3
4
5

41

HEXACO

Intention

+

People say that I am good at controlling my impulses.
1
2
3
4
5

42

HEXACO

Intention

-

I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.
1
2
3
4
5

43

HEXACO

Intention

-

I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.
1
2
3
4
5

44

HEXACO

Intention

+

I don’t allow my impulses to govern my behavior.
1
2
3
4
5

45

HEXACO

Intention

+

I think carefully before doing anything that might be unsafe or unhealthy.
1
2
3
4
5

46

HEXACO

Intention

+

I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret.
1
2
3
4
5
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47

HEXACO

Intention

-

Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise.
1
2
3
4
5

48

HEXACO

Intention

-

I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan.
1
2
3
4
5

49

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
(-/+)
explicitly outlined by my direct superior

I am likely to exert less(more) effort under circumstances in which process controls are(are not)
1

2

3

4

5

50

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
(-/+) I am likely to exert less(more) effort under circumstances in which I have more
direction(freedom) provided in completing tasks.
1
2
3
4
5

51

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
by my superior.

-

I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly outlined
1

2

3

4

5

52

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
(+/-) I believe that controls outlined by my organization(supervisor) are intended to improve the
overall success of the organization and employees alike.
1
2
3
4
5

53

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
+
I believe that freedom provided by my organization that are consistent over time are intended to
improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike
1

54

3

4

5

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
I believe that controls outlined by my organization that are consistent over time are intended to
improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike
1

55

2

2

3

4

5

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
+
I believe that freedoms outlined by my direct superior that are consistent over time are intended
to improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike
1

2
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56

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
I believe that controls outlined by my direct superior that are consistent over time are intended
to improve the overall success of the organization and employees alike
1

57

Christ 2013
JMAR Intention
subordinates when imposing controls

+

Christ 2013

JMAR Trust

+

Christ 2013

JMAR Trust

-

Choi 2014
performance

TAR

Attribution

+

Choi 2014

TAR

Attribution

+

Choi 2014

TAR

Attribution

-

Choi 2014

TAR

Attribution

4

5

2

3

4

5

-

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which my organization performs well
1

63

3

I feel that a bonus is a sign of trust when my organization is doing well financially
1

62

2

I feel that a bonus is a sign of trust from my organization regardless of my individual
1

61

5

I believe that as a superior, I generally expect subordinates to act in their own best interests
1

60

4

I believe that as a superior, I generally expect subordinates to act in the best interest of the organization
1

59

3

I believe that as a superior, I take into consideration potential negative feedback from
1

58

2

2

3

4

5

I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well.
1

2
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64

Choi 2014
TAR
overall performance.

Attribution

-

I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well, despite the organizations
1

65

Choi 2014
TAR
an indication of trust.

Attribution

+

Choi 2014

TAR

Attribution

+

Choi 2014

TAR

Attribution

+

Choi 2014
whole

TAR

Attribution

-

70

71

2

2

2

2

Douthit and Stevens 2015
TAR Distributional Fairness +
a project I am likely to exert more effort

Douthit and Stevens 2015
interest.

Douthit and Stevens 2015

TAR

TAR

3

4

5

3

4

5

3

4

5

I feel that bonuses are given as a measure of my effect on the organizations’ performance as a
1

69

5

I feel that bonuses are given solely as a measure of my personal performance
1

68

4

I feel that I should not receive a raise for periods in which the organization performs poorly
1

67

3

I feel that a bonus received during periods in which my organization does not perform well is
1

66

2

Intention

Intention

3

4

5

If my direct superior endows me with a portion of the profits gained by

1

2

-/+

I am(not) often suspicious that exchanges offered to me are actually in my best

1

2

1

I believe that there is no such thing as a free meal
2
3
4
5
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72

Douthit and Stevens 2015
even if I am benefiting

TAR

Distributional Fairness -/+
1

73

Douthit and Stevens 2015
TAR Distributional Fairness -/+
receiving a greater share, even if I am benefiting.
1

74

Douthit and Stevens 2015
TAR
and knew would not be caught.

Schatzberg & Stevens 2008
freedom to complete my task

Trust

+/-

2

Schatzberg & Stevens 2008
ability to punish me directly.

Intention

5

I am likely to reject(accept) an offer that I feel the other party is
3

4

5

I am likely to accept an offer knowing that it may be unfairly
3

4

5

3

4

5

I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair

2

2

Schatzberg & Stevens 2008
Distributional Fairness +/shared with me a higher(lower) share of profits from activity
1

79

4

3

4

5

I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has given me more(less)
1

78

3

I would be more likely to steal office supplies if I believed my salary

Distributional Fairness 1

77

2

Douthit and Stevens 2015
TAR Distributional Fairness was unfair and knew would not be caught.
1

76

2

Douthit and Stevens 2015
TAR Distributional Fairness +
distributed as long as I benefit marginally
1

75

2

I am likely to reject(accept) an offer that I feel is unfairly distributed

2

3

4

5

I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has
3

4

5

I am likely to exert more(less) effort on a task if my superior has(does not have) the
1

2
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80

Schatzberg & Stevens 2008
to punish me directly.

Trust

+/-

I am likely to exert equal levels of effort on a task regardless of my superiors the ability
1

81

Schatzberg & Stevens 2008
full effort on a task

Trust

?

Fisher et al. (2015)

JMAR Time? +

Fisher et al. (2015)

JMAR Time? -

Fisher et al. (2015)

JMAR Time? +

Fisher et al. (2015)

JMAR Time? +

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

Fisher et al. (2015)
interactions with

JMAR Time? +

2

3

4

5

I am more likely to show leniency to subordinates whom I expect repeated interactions with
1

87

3

Fisher et al. (2015)
JMAR Time? +
I am likely to be more honest with superiors who I have had extended periods of interaction
with regardless of positive or negative interaction
1

86

2

I am likely to entrust subordinates who I have had extended periods of interaction with
1

85

5

I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interactions with
1

84

4

I am likely to trust individuals that I have repeated positive interactions with
1

83

3

I am likely to reward(punish) an employee if I feel that they are (are not) exerting their
1

82

2

2

3

4

5

I am more likely to give higher levels of efforts for superiors whom I expect repeated
1

2

3
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88

89

90

91

92

93

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

JOM

JOM

JOM

JOM

JOM

Intention

+

Feedback contributes to my success at work.

1

2

3

Intention

+

To develop my skills at work, I rely on feedback.

1

2

3

Intention

+

Feedback is critical for improving performance.

1

2

3

Intention

+

Feedback from supervisors can help me advance in a company.

1

2

3

Intention

+

I find that feedback is critical for reaching my goals.

1

2

3

+

It is my responsibility to apply feedback to improve my performance.

2

3

+

I hold myself accountable to respond to feedback appropriately.

2

3

+

I don’t feel a sense of closure until I respond to feedback.

2

3

+

If my supervisor gives me feedback, it is my responsibility to respond to it.

2

3

Attribution
1

94

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

95

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

96

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1
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4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

5
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97

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

98

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

99

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

100

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)

JOM

Attribution
1

101

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)
feedback.

JOM

Attribution
1

102

Linderbaum and Levy (2010)
objectively.

JOM

Attribution
1

103

Ke and Yu (2006)
information

JAR

Trust

-

Ke and Yu (2006)

JAR

Trust

-

I feel obligated to make changes based on feedback.

2

3

+

I feel self-assured when dealing with negative feedback.

2

3

+

Compared to others, I am more competent at handling negative feedback.

2

3

+

I believe that I have the ability to deal with negative feedback effectively.

2

3

+

I feel confident when responding objectively to both positive and negative

2

3

+

I know that I can handle positive or negative feedback that I receive

2

3

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

5

I would be likely to bias my decisions in order to increase my ability to obtain superior
1

104

+

2

3

4

5

I would not bias my decision if doing so protected my employment
1

2

3
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105

Ke and Yu (2006)

JAR

Trust

+

It is never okay to bias a decision if I know that it is misleading
1

106

Ho et al. (2018)

Trust

-

Ho et al. (2018)

Trust

-

Ho et al. (2018)

Trust

-

Ho et al. (2018)

Trust

-

Ho et al. (2018)

Trust

-

Evans (2001)
Trust -/+
being punished by my superior.

Evans (2001)

Trust

-

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

It is (never)okay to keep excess resources when making budgetary decisions even without potential of
1

112

3

It is okay to give misleading information so long as there is a consensus with other decision makers.
1

111

2

It is ethical to give misleading information so long as my employer benefits.
1

110

5

It is okay to revise my decision to one that is dishonest so long as others do as well.
1

109

4

It is ethical to give misleading information so long as it provides job security.
1

108

3

I would be likely to revise a decision if my original stance affected my employment security.
1

107

2

2

3

4

5

Requesting additional funding is fine as long as there is no potential for disciplinary action
1

2

3

146

4

5

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

113

Evans (2001)

Trust

+

Keeping excess budget is not ethical even if doing so would go unnoticed by my supervisor.
1

114

Evans (2001)

Trust

-

Evans (2001)

Trust

-

Evans (2001)

Trust

+

Douthit (2017)
oversight

Intention

Lowe and Recker (1994)
Attribution

Lowe and Recker (1994)
Attribution

Lowe and Recker (1994)
Attribution

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

Outcomes outweigh the means
1

120

3

I am(am not) likely to assign blame to others if I am aware that an outcome was negative.
1

119

2

I am likely to act more honestly if I know that my superior is able to increase his level of
1

118

5

Keeping excess funds from my organization is not ethical even if supervisor review allows.
1

117

4

Keeping excess funds from my organization is fine as long as supervisor review allows.
1

116

3

Keeping excess budget is ethical if I feel that my supervisor does not trust me.
1

115

2

2

3

4

5

I agree with the statement "no harm, no foul"
1

2

3
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121

Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss
1

122

124

5

2

3

4

5

1
2
3
4
5
Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness My own needs outweigh those of common welfare
2

3

4

5

Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness Altruism is necessary for general well-being of society.
1

126

4

Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare

1
125

3

Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss
1

123

2

2

3

4

5

Fehr and Gachter (1993)
Distributional Fairness Pure altruism does not exist in real practice.
1

2

3
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TABLE 4
List of 45 Items for the Initial Q-Sort Task
Dimension

Question

Trust

If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person to get it.

Trust

I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.

Trust

If I want something from someone, I ask for it directly, instead of manipulating them into
giving it.

Trust

If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.

Trust

I wouldn't cheat a person even if he or she was a real "sucker".

Trust

I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught for avoiding them.

Trust

I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.

Trust

It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers.

Trust

Keeping excess funds is okay so long as if would go unnoticed by my manager.

Trust

Use of deception is fine so long as it provides a completive advantage.

Trust

I am likely to distrust individuals that I have repeated negative interaction with.

Trust

I am likely to trust individuals whom I have had extended periods of interaction with.

Trust

I am likely to be more honest with managers who I have had extended periods of interaction
with, regardless of positive or negative interaction.

Trust

I am more likely to show leniency to employees whom I expect repeated interactions with.

Distributional Fairness

Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.

Distributional Fairness

Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
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Distributional Fairness

I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit.

Distributional Fairness

Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair and knew I would not be caught.

Distributional Fairness

I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and knew I would not
be caught.

Distributional Fairness

I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager has shared with me a portion of the
profits.

Distributional Fairness

I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a personal loss.

Distributional Fairness

I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss.

Distributional Fairness

I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare.

Distributional Fairness

My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare.

Intention

It doesn't take much to make me angry.

Intention

I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly.

Intention

Most people tend to angry more quickly than I do.

Intention

I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought.

Intention

I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act.

Intention

I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret.

Intention

Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise.

Intention

I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy when controls are explicitly
outlined by my manager.

Intention

I believe that direction outlined by my manager is intended to improve the overall success of
the organization and employees alike.
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Intention

I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances in which directions are explicitly
outlined by my manager.

Attribution

I hold myself accountable to respond too feedback appropriately.

Attribution

I feel obligated to make change based on feedback.

Attribution

I believe that I can deal with negative feedback objectively.

Attribution

I feel self-assured when dealing with negative feedback.

Attribution

I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.

Attribution

I feel that I am entitled to a bonus for periods in which I perform well.

Attribution

I feel that bonuses are given solely as a measure of my personal performance.

Attribution

I feel that bonuses are given as a measure of my contribution towards my organizations
overall success.

Attribution

I am special and superior in many ways.

Attribution

Sometimes I feel that laws should not apply to someone like me.

Attribution

I am likely to assign blame to others if I am aware that an outcome that is negative.
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TABLE 5
Factor Loadings from EFA Principal Components Analysis with oblique Rotation
MTurk Survey EFA results: Round 1
Item
Each item indicated with a ‘*’ was utilized in the final 2
factor measure.
N = 166
Trust/Honesty
If I want something from a person I dislike I will act very
nicely toward that person in order to get it.
I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they
will do what I want.
If I knew that I could never get caught I would be willing
to steal a million dollars.
If I want something from someone I ask for it directly
instead of manipulating them into giving it.
I would not cheat a person even if he or she was a real
"sucker".
I would still pay my taxes even if I would not get caught
for avoiding them.
I would be tempted to use counterfeit money if I knew I
could get away with it.
It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior
to that of my peers.
Keeping excess funds from my organization is okay if
my manager does not notice.
Use of deception is fine if it provides me with a
competitive advantage.

Factor Loadings:

Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
Q#
Q1*

0.59

0.184

Q2*

0.807

-0.138

Q3*

0.621

-0.383

Q4

0.304

0.396

Q5

-0.173

0.551

0.238

Q6

0.597

Q7*

0.715

-0.29

0.156

Q8*

0.79

Q9*

0.826

0.16

-0.106

Q10*

0.798

-0.121

Q11*
Q12

0.348

0.467
0.467

0.159
-0.148

Q13*

0.161

0.453

0.176

Q14

0.817

0.317

Distributional Fairness
Having a high level of social status is not very important
to me.
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I
benefit.
Stealing office supplies is justified if my salary is unfair
and I know I will not be caught.
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I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my
salary was unfair and know I would not be caught.
Q15*
I am likely to exert more effort on task if my manager
has shared a portion of the profits with me.
Q16
I am willing to punish unfair acts even if it is at a
personal loss.
Q17
I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a
personal loss.
Q18*
I believe that sharing my resources is important if it
improves common welfare.
Q19*
My own needs outweigh those of the common welfare.
Q20
Intention
It does not take much to make me anger.
Q21
I rarely feel anger even when people treat me quite badly. Q22
Most people tend to anger more quickly than I do.
Q23
I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment
rather than on careful thought.
Q24
I make a lot of mistakes because I do not think before I
act.
Q25
I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might
later regret.
Q26
Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be
unwise.
Q27
I feel that my organization perceives me as untrustworthy
when controls are explicitly outlined by my manager.
Q28
I believe that direction outlined by my manager is
intended to improve the overall success of the
organization and employees alike.
I am likely to exert more effort under circumstances
where directions are explicitly outlined by my manager.

0.795

-0.133

0.108

-0.176

0.386

0.333
0.642

0.216

0.553

0.213

0.683
0.426
0.102

0.304
0.266

-0.126

0.79

0.186

-0.138

0.808

0.177

0.623

0.17

0.336

0.648
0.819

-0.202

Q29
Q30

0.596

0.334
0.273

0.18

0.34

0.198

0.469

0.558

-0.162

-0.137

0.226

Conditional
I am likely to reward a coworker if I feel that they are
exerting their full effort on a task.
I am likely to punish a coworker if I feel that they are not
exerting their full effort on a task.
I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large.
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive
luxury goods
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If I were in the role of a superior I would take into
consideration potential negative feedback from
subordinates when imposing controls.
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into
consideration potential positive feedback from
subordinates when allowing greater freedom.
I am likely to trust individuals that I have had repeated
positive interactions with.
I am likely to distrust individuals that I have had repeated
positive interactions with.
I am more likely to show leniency to individuals whom I
expect repeated interactions with.
I am more likely to give higher levels of effort towards
individuals whom I expect repeated interaction with.
I am likely to be more honest with individuals who I
have had extended periods of interaction with, regardless
of positive or negative experience.

Q35*

0.244

0.473

Q36

0.175

0.497

Q37

-0.217

Q38

0.607
0.184

Q39

0.528
0.524

Q40

0.164

Q41

0.162

0.516

0.295

0.324

* Items marked with an asterisk (*) were retained for the final 14-item, 2-factor model presented in Table 7.
a
Conditional questions were items that did not immediately seem to fit directly to one specific dimension, but
were deemed to be useful for further research for factor loadings.
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TABLE 6
CFA Results Using Reduced Scale with Three Factors
Distributional
Intention
Trust
MTurk Survey EFA results: Round 3
Fairness
Alpha
0.909
0.582
0.584
N=168
Items
7
7
5
X² = 413.886, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.757, TLI = 0.719, RMSEA = 0.113 SRMR = 0.095
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TABLE 7
CFA Results Using Reduced Scale with Two Factors
Alpha
N=168
Itemsa
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q15
Q11
Q13
Q18
Q19
Q33
Q35
a

Trust
0.923

Distributional Fairness
0.652

8
0.654
0.829
0.743
0.810
0.789
0.748
0.809
0.829
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
X² = 305.528, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.807, TLI = 0.768, RMSEA = 0.134 SRMR = 0.087

See Table 5 for the detailed wording of each item.
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6
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.379
0.413
0.802
0.659
0.397
0.383
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TABLE 8
Fit Measurements for Single Dimension Scales
Measure
X²
p
CFI
TLI RMSEA SRMR
Sensitivity to Trust
151.37 <0.001 0.863 0.808
0.198 0.060
Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness
149.11 <0.001 0.975 0.959
0.047 0.044
Variable Definitions:
Sensitivity to Trust:
The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average between both the presurvey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust' dimension. Scale ranges from
1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high.
Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness:
Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the ‘Distributional
Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high.
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TABLE 9
Send and Return Statistics
Participants

Send %

Return %

Valid

51

51

Missing

0

0

Mean

55.29%

24.64%

Median

50.00%

25.00%

N

Std. Deviation
27.74%
20.76%
Variable Definitions:
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager.
Employees are initially endowed with $10
Return %: The percentage of the wealth the manager returns to their employee. This is
calculated as (manager’s return amount) / (employee transfer * 3). Managers can only
return an amount between zero and the amount they received from the employee’s initial
transfer multiplied by 3.
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TABLE 10
Average Profit
Participants
N

All
Valid
Missing

Mean
Median

Employee

Manager

101

51

50

0

0

0

$10.66

$9.78

$11.56

10.00

9.00

11.00

Std. Deviation
4.43
3.961
4.734
*All participants’ decisions were made in whole dollar amounts.
**These amounts do not reflect the additional $5.00 show up fee paid at the end of the
experiment.
Variable Definitions:
All: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the employees at the end of both the
employee and manager decision rounds.
Employee: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the employees at the end of both
the employee and manager decision rounds.
Manager: The wealth retained by the participants designated as the managers at the end of both the
employee and manager decision rounds.
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TABLE 11
Sensitivity to Reciprocity Scores
Participants

All

Employee

Manager

101

51

50

0

0

0

Mean

2.91

2.92

2.92

Median

2.89

2.86

2.89

N

Valid
Missing

Std. Deviation
0.365
0.339
0.393
Variable Definitions:
All: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by all
participants during both the pre-survey, and post survey.
Employee: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by
employees during both the pre-survey, and post survey.
Manager: The average of all sensitivity to reciprocity measurement questions answered by
managers during both the pre-survey, and post survey.
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TABLE 12
Employee Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration
Sensitivity to
Reciprocity
Sensitivity to
Reciprocity

Level of Consideration

Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

Level of Consideration
1

0.073

51

0.613
51

.073

1

.613
51

51

Variable Definitions:
Sensitivity to Reciprocity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score
average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1
being very low, 5 being very high.
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how much
consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange decision.
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TABLE 13
Employee Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration - Mean T-Test
Level of Consideration
Sensitivity to Reciprocity

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

Low Sensitivity

4.11538

26

1.03255

High Sensitivity

4.2
4.15686

25

1.22474
1.12022

Total
51
Variable Definitions:
Low/High Sensitivity: Employee's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores.
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how much
consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange decision.
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TABLE 14
Employee Sensitivity and Endowment Sent
Sensitivity to Reciprocity
Sensitivity to Reciprocity

Pearson Correlation

1

0.083

51

0.565
51

Pearson Correlation

0.083

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

0.565
51

51

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Endowment Sent

Send %

Variable Definitions:
Sensitivity to Reciprocity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score
average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1
being very low, 5 being very high.
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. Employees
are initially endowed with $10.
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TABLE 15
Employee Sensitivity and Endowment Sent - Mean T-Test
Level of Consideration
Sensitivity to Reciprocity

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

Low Sensitivity

4.11538

26

0.24536

High Sensitivity

4.2

25

0.31236

4.15686

51

0.27738

Total
Variable Definitions:

Low/High Sensitivity: Employee's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores.
Send %: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager. Employees
are initially endowed with $10.

164

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

TABLE 16
Employee Transfer and Manager Return

% Sent by Employee

Pearson Correlation

% Sent by Employee

% Returned by
Manager

1

0.724**

Sig. (2-tailed)
% Returned by
Manager

0.000

N

51

51

Pearson Correlation

0.724**

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

0.000
51

51

Variable Definitions:
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all
participant's percentages.
% Returned by Manager: The percentage of endowment returned divided by the amount received
from the employee's initial transfer. Employee’s initial endowment was $10, any amount
transferred to the manager was multiplied by 3.
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TABLE 17
Descriptive Statistics

n
Average % Returned
Median % Returned
Average Returned (Std.
Dev)

Manager
Low
Reciprocity

Manager
High
Reciprocity

n
Average % Returned
(Std. Dev)

n
Average % Returned
(Std. Dev)

All Manager
50
26.13%
26.67%
0.2063
Employee % Low
Cell 1
9

Employee % High
Cell 2
14

18.09% (.1290)

41.07% (.2085)

Cell 3
14

Cell 4
14

7.22% (.1081)

35.99% (.1402)

Participants assumed the role of either an employee or manager for a hypothetical firm, both of
whom made a decision to share a portion of their wealth with one another. Each participant
made one transfer decision.
Variable Definitions:
Average % Returned (Std. Dev): The percentage of endowment returned divided by the
amount received from the employee's initial transfer. Employee’s initial endowment was
$10, any amount transferred to the manager was multiplied by 3.
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all
participant's percentages.
Manager Reciprocity: Manager's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores.
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TABLE 18
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Reciprocity on
Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50)

Source of variance
df
F
p-value, two-tailed
Intercept
1
133.787
<0.001
Employee %
1
34.190
<0.001
Manager Reciprocity
1
3.243
0.078
Employee % * Manager Reciprocity
1
0.428
0.516
Error
46
Variable Definitions:
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all
participant's percentages
Manager Reciprocity: Manager's reciprocity was classified as either high or low by a median split
based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Reciprocity scores.
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TABLE 19
Final Scale Correlation Table

Q1

Q1
1

Q2
.621**

Q3
.473**

Q7
.461**

Q8
.475**

Q9
.475**

Q10
.589**

Q11
-.063

Q13
.005

Q15
.519**

Q18
-.084

Q19
-.164*

Q33
-.138

Q35
.150

avg
.638**

Q2

.621**

1

.583**

.621**

.667**

.576**

.746**

-.135

.104

.672**

-.070

-.044

-.029

-.014

.782**

Q3

.473**

.583**

1

.782**

.561**

.458**

.534**

-.144

.071

.634**

-.143

-.050

-.416**

.050

.670**

Q7

.461**

.621**

.782**

1

.577**

.618**

.565**

-.154*

.082

.761**

-.089

-.069

-.309**

.014

.736**

Q8

.475**

.667**

.561**

.577**

1

.651**

.763**

-.017

.216**

.582**

-.001

.018

-.053

-.010

.785**

Q9

.475**

.576**

.458**

.618**

.651**

1

.586**

-.008

.200**

.694**

.081

.092

.123

.004

.796**

Q10

.589**

.746**

.534**

.565**

.763**

.586**

1

-.076

.035

.607**

-.019

-.057

-.037

.075

.776**

Q11

-.063

-.135

-.144

-.154*

-.017

-.008

-.076

1

.130

-.070

.259**

.272**

.272**

.205**

.132

Q13

.005

.104

.071

.082

.216**

.ks200**

.035

.130

1

.090

.394**

.209**

.122

.101

.316**

Q15

.519**

.672**

.634**

.761**

.582**

.694**

.607**

-.070

.090

1

-.068

-.070

-.080

.062

.790**

Q18

-.084

-.070

-.143

-.089

-.001

.081

-.019

.259**

.394**

-.068

1

.527**

.302**

.305**

.221**

Q19

-.164*

-.044

-.050

-.069

.018

.092

-.057

.272**

.209**

-.070

.527**

1

.284**

.289**

.211**

Q33

-.138

-.029

-.416**

-.309**

-.053

.123

-.037

.272**

.122

-.080

.302**

.284**

1

.087

.092

Q35

.150

-.014

.050

.014

-.010

.004

.075

.205**

.101

.062

.305**

.289**

.087

1

.247**

.638**

.782**

.670**

.736**

.785**

.796**

.776**

.132

.316**

.790**

.221**

.211**

.092

.247**

1

Averag
e

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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TABLE 19 (continued)
Item Reference
Q2

If I want something from a person I dislike I will act very nicely toward that person in
order to get it.
I sometimes try to make people feel guilty so that they will do what I want.

Q3

If I knew that I could never get caught I would be willing to steal a million dollars.

Q7

I would be tempted to use counterfeit money if I knew I could get away with it.

Q8

It is okay to use deception to obtain information superior to that of my peers.

Q9

Keeping excess funds from my organization is okay if my manager does not notice.

Q10

Use of deception is fine if it provides me with a competitive advantage.

Q11

Having a high level of social status is not very important to me.

Q13

Q18

I am likely to reject an offer that I feel is unfair even if I benefit.
I would be more likely to embezzle if I believed my salary was unfair and know I
would not be caught.
I am willing to reward acts of kindness even if it is at a personal loss.

Q19

I believe that sharing my resources is important if it improves common welfare.

Q33

I would never accept a bribe even if it were very large.
If I were in the role of a superior I would take into consideration potential negative
feedback from subordinates when imposing controls.

Q1

Q15

Q35
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TABLE 20
Employee Trust Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration
Trust
Sensitivity
Trust Sensitivity

Level of Consideration

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
51

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

0.201
0.158
51

Level of
Consideration
0.201
0.158
51

Variable Definitions:
Trust Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust'
dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high.
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how
much consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange
decision.
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TABLE 21
Employee Distributional Fairness Sensitivity and Reciprocal Consideration
Distributional
Level of
Fairness
Consideration
Sensitivity
Distributional Fairness
Sensitivity

Pearson Correlation

Level of Consideration

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
51
-0.208
0.143
51

-0.208
0.143
51
1
51

Variable Definitions:
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity
score average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within
the ‘Distributional Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being
very high.
Level of consideration: Participants answered a post experimental question gauging how
much consideration of their paired participants’ actions weighted on their exchange
decision.
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TABLE 22
Employee Trust Sensitivity and Endowment Sent
Trust Sensitivity
Trust Sensitivity

Pearson Correlation

Endowment Sent

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N

1
51
-0.013
0.926
51

Send %
-0.013
0.926
51
1

Variable Definitions:
Trust Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity score average
between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the 'Trust'
dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very high.
Endowment Sent: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager.
Employees are initially endowed with $10.

172

51

A VIEW INTO RECIPROCITY – Green 2019

TABLE 23
Employee Distributional Fairness Sensitivity and Endowment Sent
Distributional
Fairness
Sensitivity
Distributional Fairness
Sensitivity

Pearson Correlation

1

0.155

51

0.276
51

Pearson Correlation

0.155

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

0.276
51

51

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Endowment Sent

Send %

Variable Definitions:
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: The participants’ average overall sensitivity to reciprocity
score average between both the pre-survey and post-survey deployed for all Items within the
‘Distributional Fairness’ dimension. Scale ranges from 1-5, 1 being very low, 5 being very
high.
Endowment Sent: The percentage of the employee’s initial endowment sent to their manager.
Employees are initially endowed with $10.
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TABLE 24
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Trust
Sensitivity on Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50)

Source of variance
df
F
p-value, two-tailed
Intercept
1
69.086
<0.001
Employee %
1
35.430
<0.001
Trust Sensitivity
1
0.048
0.827
Employee % * Trust Sensitivity
1
0.389
0.536
Error
46
Variable Definitions:
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all
participant's percentages
Trust Sensitivity: Manager's trust sensitivity was classified as either high or low by a median
split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Trust scores.
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TABLE 25
Test of Between-Subject Effects of Employee % Transferred and Manager’s Distributional
Fairness Sensitivity on Manager’s Average % Returned (n=50)

Source of variance
df
F
p-value, two-tailed
Intercept
1
67.802
<0.001
Employee %
1
35.585
<0.001
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity
1
0.138
0.712
Employee % * Trust Sensitivity
1
0.003
0.956
Error
46
Variable Definitions:
Employee %: The percentage of the employee's initial endowment of $10 transferred to their
manager. Employee % was classified as either high or low by a median split based on all
participant's percentages
Distributional Fairness Sensitivity: Manager's trust sensitivity was classified as either high or low
by a median split based on aggregate averages of their Sensitivity to Distributional Fairness
scores.
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